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Abstract
Our research question arise from an empirical problem regarding the
introduction and spread of new, more flexible, contractual forms in
the Italian labour market in the aftermath of the economic crisis.
The aim of the work is the decomposition of changes in the distri-
bution of wages using a semi-parametric methodology to estimate
counterfactual densities in order to analyse the role of various ex-
planatory factors (composition and discrimination effects). Using
data from from Eurostat, the Italian cross-sectional EU-SILC sur-
veys 2007 and 2013, results show that a wage penalty at the bottom
of distribution of wages is most important explanations accounting
for pay differences between temporary and permanent contracts
while changes in the distribution of wages across time are due to
the job-polarisation of the labour market in which low paid jobs are
the most affected.
Disclaimer: The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data
lies entirely with the author
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Introdution
In the recent years there has been a growing interest in the evalua-
tion literature for models that are informative on the impact distribu-
tion: while regression on the mean gives us only a generic picture, the
description of the differences of the impact among the entire distribution
of an outcome variable is now considered fundamental: when evaluating
the efficacy of social programmes the researchers should investigate not
only if a program did or did not work but also how, why and for whom
(Imai & Ratkovic, 2013). This research then seeks to contribute to the
field of the evaluation of effects among the entire distribution of an out-
come variable of interest. Our research question arise from an empirical
problem regarding the change occurred in wage distribution of workers
and the consequent increase of wage inequalities in the labour market.
The introduction and spread of new, more flexible, contractual forms
since the early 1990’s has contributed to lessen the employment protec-
tion legislation in all the European labour markets. In Italy as well a
series of measures introduced various kind of flexible contracts. More-
over between 2008 and 2009 a global financial crisis deeply impacted the
European Nations in terms of job losses, lack of wage growths and rising
inequalities. For these reasons understanding and monitoring changing
in the nature of work relationships is crucial to reinforce the present and
future quality of life for the workers. The aim of the work is the de-
composition of changes in the density of wages using a semi-parametric
methodology to estimate counterfactual densities, that has never been
implemented for the Italian case. The role of various explanatory fac-
tors is analysed to account for the evolution and the differences of wages
for temporary and permanent workers. We analyse also to what extent
wage inequality has changed in Italy before and after the economic crisis
because of the spread of the new contractual forms and changes in the
1
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wage structure. This study is based on data from Eurostat, the Euro-
pean Union-Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2007
and 2013 cross-sectional waves, to cover the periods before and after
the crisis. In the first Chapter we present a review of the most recent
techniques to evaluate effects among the entire distribution of an out-
come variable of interest. In the second Chapter we will introduce the
economic framework describing the reforms and trends that character-
ized the evolution of the Italian labour market. The third Chapter is
dedicated to the description and implementation of the semi-parametric
technique used to estimate the counterfactual distributions. Results and
conclusions of the analysis are presented in the fourth and last Chapter.
Disclaimer: The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data
lies entirely with the author
Chapter1
Beyond the mean
1.1 Introduction
The traditional approach to social program evaluation has been cen-
tred on estimating mean impacts. According to Heckman et al. (1997)
the case for using the mean to evaluate a programme is funded upon two
key conventions: the first is that an increase in the total output increases
welfare, and the second is that undesirable distributional aspects of pro-
grammes are either unimportant or are somehow compensated. However
they discuss that both of these assumptions are unlikely to be realized
in reality as many programme-driven changes cannot be redistributed
or condensate to produce a measure of total welfare and they prove
indeed that heterogeneity in response to programmes is empirically rel-
evant (Heckman et al., 1997). Since this seminal work the scope of the
analysis of the distribution of an outcome variable, i.e. to explore what
are the differences in the response of people to a programme, has been a
topic of intense research in the last decade. Treatment effect heterogene-
ity is defined as the degree to which treatments have different (causal)
effects on each unit. In other words the researchers should infer how
treatment effects vary across individual units and/or how causal effects
differ across various treatments (Djebbari & Smith, 2008). Indeed, the
estimation of such important differences should play an essential role
in selecting the most effective programme, finding sub-populations for
which a treatment is effective or harmful and generalizing causal effect
estimates obtained from an experimental sample to a target population
(Imai & Ratkovic, 2013).
A first method to represent heterogeneity of impacts in terms of
3
4 CHAPTER 1. BEYOND THE MEAN
observables is already allowed for in the linear regression framework:
indeed it is possible to identify subgroups for which the mean impact
could be different, adding interaction terms between the intervention
and observables (Ravallion, 2009). However this technique may miss
some important dimensions of heterogeneity. As noted by some authors
(Jackson & Page (2013), Bitler et al. (2006) and Heckman et al. (1997)) if
within-group variation exceeds across-group variation in mean impacts,
subgroup analysis may fail to capture important differences in treatment
effects and this kind of evidence could be decisive in making relevant de-
cisions regarding interventions aimed at reducing inequalities. Moreover
not all sources of heterogeneity are observable so another approach in
the linear framework would be to allow for latent heterogeneity using
a random coefficient estimator1. However in the contest of evaluation,
looking at subgroup variation in treatment effects basically allows an as-
sessment of the efficiency of actual and potential targeting rules, while
estimation of the extent of variation in impacts not related to observ-
ables may show the need for data collection to be improved (Djebbari &
Smith (2008), Angrist (2004)). Knowledge about how program impacts
vary, and how they relate to untreated outcomes give information on
how inequality is affected by programmes which is the most interest-
ing and useful thing in this context (Khandker et al., 2009). We begin
this first Chapter presenting a review of the recent evaluation literature
dedicated to methods for assessing heterogeneous treatment effects on
distributions.
1.2 A Statistical Approach to Evaluation
The fundamental aspect of the programme evaluation problem is
that one can not simultaneously observe an individual receiving a treat-
ment from a programme and not receiving it. The concept of counter-
factual is then introduced to picture different hypothetical states of the
world or outcomes. In fact to allow for causal interpretation of impacts,
the comparison between outcomes should be setted in a way that only
the presence or absence of the treatment varies across the states, holding
all other factors constant (Heckman, 2008). Defining and estimating a
proper counterfactual is therefore the central focus of statistical method-
ology in this field. In the simplest form of the evaluation problem, every
1Applying this type of estimator to the evaluation data for PROGRESA,
Djebbari & Smith (2008) find that they can convincingly reject the common
effects assumption in past evaluations.
1.2. A STATISTICAL APPROACH TO EVALUATION 5
individual i can present one of two mutually exclusive states of the world
described by a binary random variable Di = {0,1} where 0 represent the
untreated (or non-participant) state and 1 the treated (or participant)
state. A potential outcome for each individual Yi is linked to each state:
potential outcome=
{
Y 1i if Di = 1
Y 0i if Di = 0
Unfortunately, as stated before, only one outcome is observable for each
person and this relation is summarized in the following well-known equa-
tion, the Neyman-Rubin Model (Rubin (1972),Rubin (2005)):
Yi = Y 0i · (1−Di)+Y 1i ·Di
In other words Y 0i is the outcome of an individual that has undergone
a treatment, while Y 1i is the individual’s outcome had s/he experienced
the programme (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). The measure of the dif-
ference between Y 0i and Y
1
i can then be considered the causal effect of the
treatment for individual i and it the primary interest of the researcher.
It is now possible to set a first definition of causal impact (α) that
doesn’t require any further specification or assumption. It is simply the
difference between the two potential outcomes, namely between what
can be observed in the presence of the treatment, the factual, and what
could be observed without it, the counterfactual:
αi = Y 1i −Y 0i
Comparing the potential outcomes for each individual is of course impos-
sible and Holland (1986) defined it the ”fundamental problem of causal
inference”. Traditionally this problem has been overcome by the identi-
fication of the average effect on a target population or group of people,
assuming the effect would be constant for all individuals or, at most,
assuming heterogeneity for sub-groups of population. One measure of
interest is the average difference between a randomly selected group of
individuals that experience a treatment and another randomly selected
group of untreated individuals. This quantity is better known as the
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) which represents the expected value of
the effect for a generic individual randomly selected (Xie et al., 2012):
E(α) = E(Y 1−Y 0) = E(Y 1)−E(Y 0)
Since ATE is defined for the whole population, it is not very useful for
evaluation purposes. More often it is better to identify the treatment
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effect for a defined sub-population, usually the one composed by recipi-
ents, and this measure is defined as the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT):
αATT = E(α|D= 1) = E
[
Y 1i −Y 0i |Di = 1
]
= E
[
Y 1i |Di = 1
]−E [Y 0i |Di = 1]
with the second term corresponding to the counterfactual. Estimation of
this quantity often involves the comparison in time of the same group of
treated to avoid time variation bias, comparison between different groups
of people to avoid selection bias, or a combination of both (Imbens &
Angrist, 1994).
However,since there is likely to be a distribution for both Y 1i and
Y 0i in the population, it is more realistic to move beyond the mean
and to think that the treatment effect is different for different people.
It would be more accurate then to construct the outcome distribution
for both participants and non-participants to better evaluate all the
implication of a program. Unfortunately this of course brings along
more complications than the estimation of the single mean (Heckman
et al., 1999).
The cumulative distribution for a random variable Yd evaluated at y
can be defined as the probability that Yd will take a value less than or
equal to y:
FYd(y) = Pr(Yd ≤ y) = E[1(Yd ≤ y)]
In the simplest case, a true experiment with of random assignment,
FY1(y) and FY0(y) are easily identified:
FY1(y) = E[1(Y ≤ y)|D= 1]
FY0(y) = E[1(Y ≤ y)|D= 0]
Thus we can give a first, very general definition of the distributional
treatment effect as the difference between the distribution of the outcome
for the treated population and the distribution of the outcome for the
untreated population:
DTE(y) = FY1(y)−FY0(y)
From the identification of FY1(y) and FY0(y) it follows the identification
of any function of these marginal distributions like quantiles. Since they
have a natural and intuitive interpretation they were greatly exploited
in the development of this brunch of literature.
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1.3 The Quantile Regression
A first powerful tool to look into the distribution of an outcome
variable is the quantile regression model introduced by Koenker & Bas-
sett (1978) and subsequently highly developed and exploited2. Quantile
regression models seek to extend the idea of quantiles (the division of
reference population into segments of equal proportion) to the estima-
tion of models in which the quantiles of the conditional distribution of
the response variable are expressed as functions of observed covariates
(Koenker & Bassett, 1978). Intuitively the philosophy beneath quantile
and conventional regressions is a lot alike: adding covariates can capture
confounding factors, interaction terms, likewise mean regressions, iden-
tify sub-groups effects and instrumental variables methods have been
developed as well to estimate causal effects on quantiles when selection-
on-observables assumption is not valid (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). We
start the discussion reminding that, since the conditional expectation
function (CEF) of a dependent variable Y given a vector of covariates X
is the expectation of Y holding the covariates fixed, then the conditional
quantile function (CQF) at a fixed quantile τ given a vector of regressors
X can be as well defined as:
Qτ(Yi|Xi) = F−1Y (τ|Xi) = inf{y : FY (y|Xi)> τ} (1.1)
where FY (y|Xi) is the distribution function for yi conditional on Xi. Changes
in the CQF of Y as a function of covariates show us whether the disper-
sion in the outcome variable increases or decreases with the covariate of
interest or whether their relationship is changing over time, when time
is included (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Keeping the discussion simple,
with no loss of generality, we can assume a separable model of the kind:
Yτi = q(Xi)+ εi
Like the standard regression models, also the quantiles can be expressed
as the solution to an optimization problem as
Qτ(Yi|Xi) = arg minE[ρτ(Yi−q(Xi))]
where ρτ is the loss or check function because, when plotted, it looks
like a check-mark and it weights positive and negative elements in an
2Ashenfelter & Card (2011), Machado & Silva (2013), Angrist & Krueger
(1999), Elder et al. (2015), Melly (2005), Powell et al. (2014) and Lamarche
(2011), Galvao et al. (2013), Geraci & Bottai (2007) for panel data, just to cite
a few.
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asymmetrical way:
ρτ(u) = 1(u> 0) · τu+1(u6 0) · (1− τ)u.
This asymmetric weighting generates a minimand that allows to choose
conditional quantiles.
In the general case a linear setting is chosen to describe the relationship
between the outcome and the covariates:
q(Xi) = X
′
iβτ
and sequentially:
βτ ≡ arg minE[ρτ(Yi−X ′i b)]
This is a linear programming problem that can be solved with standard
statistical software (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). So quantile regression
allows to estimate different coefficients for each quantile τ in the distri-
bution of the outcome Y conditional on a vector of covariates X . This is
a first way to present a program distributional impact by examining the
effects for households or individuals across the range of Y . Specifically,
the quantile coefficients can be interpreted as the partial derivative of
the conditional quantile of Y with respect to one of the regressors, such
as program D (Khandker et al., 2009). When the coefficients are equal
we are in presence of a so-called ”location-shift” effect, meaning that
changes in covariates have the same effect all over the distribution and
within-group inequality remain fixed. In contrast if coefficient estimates
differ across quantiles then changes in the covariates have a different
role across the outcome distribution increasing (or decreasing) inequal-
ity, changing the variance within groups (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). This
is one of the reasons quantile regression methods have acquired an impor-
tant role in the evaluation process. In fact, since their first appearance,
quantile regression models have been used in a great deal of empirical
works and this short list is just an example: Buchinsky (1994), Messi-
nis (2013), Lamarche (2011), Jackson & Page (2013), Djebbari & Smith
(2008) and Dammert (2008). In empirical economics, one of the moti-
vations under the exploitation of quantile regression models relies in the
interest of labour economists to understand inequality in wages distri-
butions (Buchinsky, 1994), particularity in how it changes conditional
on specific covariates like education and training (Angrist & Pischke,
2009). The whole conditional wage distribution, estimated by quantile
regression methods, can be given a natural economic interpretation since
the quantile regression coefficients can be interpreted as rates of return
to different characteristics at different points of the conditional wage
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distribution (Melly, 2005). Quantile regressions capture the impact of
changes in covariates upon a conditional wage distribution in very much
the same way that mean regression measures the impact of changes in
covariates upon the mean of the conditional wage distribution (Machado
& Mata, 2005). However, in the evaluation setting is crucial to point
out two tricky elements of quantile regression as it has been described so
far. First of all quantile coefficients describe changes in the distribution
of the outcome but not on individuals, meaning that they describe what
happens, for example, to the group at the bottom 10 percent of the
distribution in presence or absence of the intervention regardless of the
individuals that compose that group. Second, we have described so far
only conditional quantiles. On the other hand moving from conditional
to marginal quantiles allows us to investigate the impact of changes in
quantile regression coefficients on overall inequality and not only condi-
tional on covariates (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Both of the aspects will
be addressed in detail in the next paragraph.
1.3.1 Quantile Regression and Quantile Treatment Ef-
fects
The crucial point of every evaluation using a set of regression esti-
mates is whether they have a causal interpretation (Angrist & Pischke,
2009). Like the average treatment effect, a proper counterfactual setting
is needed since we don’t have information about what position an indi-
vidual i would have in the untreated distribution, had s/he been placed
in the treated one. However if the program is randomized, and the omit-
ted variable bias can be excluded, the quantile treatment effects (QTEs)
of a program on a distribution can be calculated as the difference in the
conditional outcome Y |X across treatment and control individuals that
fall in the quantile τ of Y |X . When the program is assigned randomly
the QTE is defined as the change in the quantiles of the distribution of
the conditional outcome:
QTEτ = Qτ(Y |X ,D= 1)−Qτ(Y |X ,D= 0) (1.2)
As briefly introduced in the previous paragraph, when QTEs are identi-
fied they allow to describe the effects on the distribution of the outcome
of interest but they do not give information regarding the effects on in-
dividual beneficiaries. In fact QTEs cannot identify the distribution of
treatment effects (Y 1,Y 0) nor can they identify the impact for individuals
at specific quantiles (Jackson & Page, 2013). This is due to the fact that
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from two marginal distributions (participants and non-participants) it
is generally not possible to estimate the joint distribution of outcomes
(Y 1,Y 0) that would be necessary to estimate the distribution of impacts
Y 1i -Y
0
i (Heckman et al., 1997). QTEs can be informative about the im-
pact distribution only when the potential outcomes observed under var-
ious level of treatment are comonotonic3 random variables (Fort, 2012).
This strong assumptions is referred as rank invariance of the distribution
in the presence and absence of the intervention and describe a situation
in which the presence or the absence of a programme does not change
the position of individuals along the distribution of the outcome (Fort
(2012), Jackson & Page (2013)).
So far we have described QTEs that are conditional on a set of chosen
covariates. Unfortunately in the evaluation setting, researchers are more
concerned with the effects that a program can have on the unconditional
distribution of Y 1 and Y 0 , namely QTEs of the kind:
QTEτ = Y 1(τ)−Y 0(τ)
Very intuitively unconditional QTEs could be estimated exploiting the
quantile regression model (QR) only in a very specific case i.e. when the
treatment is randomly assigned, it can be identified by a dummy and no
other covariates are included in the model. Only in this case the coef-
ficient on the treatment variable is numerically equal to QTE as defined
in 1.2. This is due to the fact that the law of iterated expectations does
not hold for quantiles (Angrist & Pischke, 2009):
Qτ(Yi|Xi) = X ′iβτ ; Qτ(Yi) = Qτ(Xi)
′
βτ
This means that when additional control variables are added for identifi-
cation purposes or just to get more precise estimators, the QR coefficient
identifies a conditional QTE on the covariates which has a different
meaning from its unconditional counterpart (Fort, 2012). Conditioning
on covariates in fact affects the interpretation of the disturbance term,
i.e. the variable describing the relative position of an individual in the
outcome distribution. Consequently the interpretation of estimates from
a quantile regression changes as covariates are added as they shift an ob-
servation’s placement in the conditional distribution (Fort, 2012). The
3Comonotonicity/coutercomonotonicity is defined as the perfect posi-
tive/negative dependence between the components of a random vector, i.e.
simultaneously non-decreasing/non-increasing in each component. This vector
can be represented as an increasing/decreasibg functions of a single random
variable (Dhaene et al., 2002).
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conditional QTE show the effect for individuals with relatively low/high
Y even if their absolute value of Y is high/low. The unconditional QTE
on the other hand show the effect on a relatively low/high absolute Y .
Usually unconditional QTEs are more relevant to policy analysis as are
more useful to make decision and can be estimated without parametric
assumptions more precisely than conditional effects. Moving from con-
ditional to marginal unconditional quantiles in a counterfactual setting
is an area of active research (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
1.3.2 Estimation of QTEs
After the description of the general setting we can move to discuss
some of the most useful and easily applicable estimation procedures.
This collection of estimation methods was originally put together by
Frölich & Melly (2010) and implemented in STATA in a unique com-
mand. Their intuition is based on the observation that when the treat-
ment variable is a dummy and the other regressors work as controls, a
propensity-score type weighting scheme can be used to produce different
QTEs, exploiting the QR minimization linear programming properties
(Frölich & Melly, 2010). These methods include the four most common
scenarios in the evaluation literature: they allow both for exogeneity
(or selection on observables) and endogeneity (selection on unobserv-
ables) of the treatment and produce both conditional and unconditional
QTEs. Koenker & Bassett (1978) propose a method that can estimate
conditional QTEs when the treatment is exogenous. When the exo-
geneity assumption may not hold the instrumental-variable estimator of
Abadie et al. (2002) can be used to find conditional QTEs If uncondi-
tional QTEs is what the researcher is interested in, it is possible to use
the method developed by Firpo (2007)4 when the treatment is exoge-
nous, and Frölich & Melly (2013) if the treatment is endogenous. The
implementation of these estimators (except for the one of Koenker &
Bassett (1978)) requires the preliminary non-parametric estimation of
a propensity score. We present these techniques following the notation
and structure of Frölich & Melly (2010).
Clearly the starting point is the linear quantile regression model for
each potential outcome:
Y τi = Xiβ τ +Dγτ + εi and Qτεi = 0
where i are the individuals and D is the treatment dummy. Qτεi is the
τth quantile of the unobserved random variable εi. β τ and γτ are the
4Others may be Frölich (2007) and Melly (2005)
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unknown parameters of the model where γτ is the conditional QTE at
quantile τ. Starting with the simplest case, it is assumed that both D
and X are exogenous and selection on observables is a valid assumption
that makes the model identifiable:
ε ⊥ (D,X)
The model-linearity assumption, together with the selection on observ-
ables assumption imply that:
QτY |X ,D = Xβ
τ +Dγτ
meaning that we can estimate the unknown parameters from the joint
distribution of Y , X and D which are all observable from the data. The
unknown coefficients can thus be estimated by the classical estimator of
Koenker & Bassett (1978)
(βˆ τ , δˆ τ) = argmin∑ ρτ(Yi−Xiβ −Diγ)
= argmin∑WKBi ×ρτ(Yi−Xiβ −Diγ)
where WKBi are all equal to 1 and γτ is the conditional QTE from an ex-
ogenous program. The second line of the equation is needed to illustrate
the connection with the other estimators we are considering.
Since very few studies arise from randomized experiments, many ap-
plications deal with a treatment D potentially endogenous and require
an instrumental variable (IV) identification strategy. The presence of
a valid instrument Z is then necessary alongside the dummy treatment
variable Dz to estimate QTEs. Below we report the standard assump-
tions required for IV models, i.e. monotonicity (the non-existence for
defiers) and a conditional independence assumption on the IV:
(Y 0,Y 1,D0,D1)⊥ Z|X
0< Pr(Z = 1|X)< 1
E(D1|X) 6= E(D0|X)
Pr(D1 ≥ D0|X) = 1
Individuals with D1 ≥ D0 are referred to as compliers5 and treatment
effects can be identified only for this group. Abadie et al. (2002) show in
5We refers as compliers the sub-population that is induced by the instrument
to change the value of the endogenous regressors (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009)
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their work that the conditional QTE γτ for compliers can be consistently
estimated by this version of a weighted quantile regression:
( ˆβ τIV , ˆγτIV ) = argmin∑WAAIi ×ρτ(Yi−Xiβ −Diγ)
WAAIi = 1−
Di(1−Zi)
1−Pr(Z = 1|Xi) −
(1−Di)Zi
Pr(Z = 1|Xi)
Pr(Z = 1|Xi) needs to be preliminary estimated, which can be obtained
with traditional models like probit or logit6. The two estimators pre-
sented above focused on conditional treatment effects.
Now we move to the two methods that allow to estimate uncondi-
tional QTEs while using covariates only for identification and to increase
efficiency. The covariates X are included in the first-step estimation of
the probit model and then integrated out thanks to the weighting scheme
in order to produce an estimation of the effect that is not a function of
the covariates any more. In the case of unconditional endogenous QTE
Frölich & Melly (2013) proposed an estimator with the following weight-
ing scheme:
( ˆατIV , ˆ∆τIV ) = argmin∑WFMi ×ρτ(Yi−α−Di∆)
WFMi =
Zi−Pr(Z = 1|Xi)
Pr(Z = 1|Xi) [1−Pr(Z = 1|Xi)](2Di−1)
To make a quick comparison, both the weights WAAIi and W
FM
i are cre-
ated to identify the compliers, but only the latter has the property to
balance the distribution of the covariates between the treated and non
treated compliers (Frölich & Melly, 2010). Pr(Z = 1|Xi) can be prelimi-
nary estimated with a probit or logit model.
Finally we consider the case where the QTEs are unconditional and
the treatment is exogenous conditional on X . The assumption that the
support of the covariates is the same independently of the treatment is
required because in a non parametric model the conditional distribution
outside the support of the covariates cannot be defined:
(Y 0,Y 1)⊥ D|X
0< Pr(D= 1|X)< 1
The estimator proposed by Firpo (2007) is then the following:
(αˆτ , ∆ˆτ) = argmin∑WFi ×ρτ(Yi−α−Di∆)
WFi =
Di
Pr(Di = 1|Xi) +
1−Di
1−Pr(Di = 1|Xi)
6Optimization problems can arise since some of the weights can be negative
and produce a non convex situation (Abadie et al., 2002).
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This is a traditional propensity-score weighting estimator or inverse
probability weighting where Pr(D = 1|Xi) is estimated with a probit or
logit model. The coefficients for the variable D obtained with these
estimation procedures, represent the QTEs of the programme.
Another set of methods developed in the literature to estimate het-
erogeneous impacts on a distribution of an outcome, has relied on a
different approach even though it refers again to the estimation of quan-
tile coefficients and the linear relationship assumption between the out-
come and the covariates. Machado & Mata (2005) for example estimate
quantile coefficients of the conditional wage distribution using Koenker
& Bassett (1978) quantile regression then use re-sampling non paramet-
ric algorithm to estimate both the real and the counterfactual uncon-
ditional distribution using different re-weighting schemes. Also Melly
(2005) estimates a conditional wage distribution by quantile regression
and then integrate out covariates to obtain unconditional quantiles like
Machado & Mata (2005) but he extends the method solving the problem
of crossing of different quantile curves and by determining the asymp-
totic distribution of their estimator. Firpo et al. (2009) instead run a
regression of the re-centered influence function (RIF) of the uncondi-
tional quantile on the explanatory variables to estimate parameters that
capture changes in unconditional quantiles in the presence of exogenous
regressors. It is worth noting then that Quantile Regression approach
has been very important in the evaluation setting to develop methods
for the estimation of counterfactual settings allowing empirical analysis
to look for heterogeneous effects over a whole distribution. On the other
hand this methods present some drawbacks, like the linear assumption
between the outcome and the covariates and the fact that from quantile
coefficients it is not possible to reconstruct other statistics of the distri-
bution. Both of these limitations are overcome by the following set of
methods.
1.4 Distributional Treatment Effects
So far we have focused on the quantile function QY (τ) and its param-
eters. However in order to evaluate treatment effects on distributions it
is possible to work on either the quantile function QY (τ) or the distri-
bution function FY (y) since one is the inverse of the other as shown in
Eq.1.1. The natural estimator for the distribution function is of course
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the empirical distribution function:
FˆY (y) =
1
n∑i
1(yi 6 y)
from which the quantile function QY (τ) can be derived:
QˆY (τ) = in f{y|FˆY (y)> τ}
since the quantile function is invariant to monotone transformations.
In this very simple non-parametric case, estimating one or another is
clearly the same. Unfortunately almost certainly empirical problems re-
quire assumptions and parametric models. When this happen modelling
the QF or the CDF is a different procedure and another brunch of lit-
erature is required. In this paragraph we will present a short review
of this alternative methodology even though some parallelisms can be
done: like quantile estimators we may not want to work with conditional
distributions even when we need covariates for identification. The so-
lution would be then to estimate the conditional distribution and then
integrate it out to obtain the unconditional one:
FY (y) = f (y;x) =
∫
x∈Ωx
F(y|x)dF(x)
With this notation it is easy to see that a policy or an intervention
can affect the distribution of the outcome of interest in two different
ways: changing the distribution of the covariates F(x) or changing the
relationship between the outcome and the covariates represented by the
conditional distribution F(y|x). To asses either changes a counterfac-
tual exercise is required (Chernozhukov et al., 2013). To be more clear,
let’s introduce the empirical setting we will be using later on. Sup-
pose we would like to analyse the wage differences between two group
of workers and to asses the impact on these distributions of the type of
contract they are subjected. Given a dummy variable D = {0,1}, let 0
denote the population of workers with a permanent contract and 1 de-
note workers with a temporary job. Yd denotes wages and Xd denotes job
marked-relevant characteristics that affects wages for population d. Let
FYd |Xd (y|x) be the generic conditional distribution for Yd , where FY1|X1(y|x)
and FY0|X0(y|x) represent the observed conditional distribution functions
of wages for temporary and permanent workers respectively. In this
context the counterfactual distribution FcY (y) can be defined as the dis-
tribution function of wages that would have prevailed for permanent
workers had they faced temporary workers wage schedule FY1|X1 :
FcY1(y) = F
c
Y1|X0(y|x) =
∫
FY1|X1(y|x)dFX0(x) (1.3)
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This distribution is constructed by integrating the conditional distri-
bution of wages for temporary workers with respect to the distribution
of characteristics of permanent workers. The methods we are going to
briefly present can rely on manipulation of the conditional distribution
or the distribution of the covariates (Fortin et al., 2011). The counterfac-
tual distributions can be estimated both with regression-type techniques
or with semi-parametric reweighing methods and both are correct and
well performing. They also produce same results when one uses a sat-
urated model to calculate the propensity score and the regression is
conditional on the same covariates (Melly (2005), Chernozhukov et al.
(2013)). To be able to give a causal interpretation for these effects we
need to add more assumptions as we are going to discuss since this will
be the approach on this work. One of the reasons relies on the fact that
it allows a decomposition exercise which has been proven very useful in
analysing wages.
1.4.1 Decomposition Methods
The kind of counterfactual that we have just defined is the key ingre-
dient of the decomposition methods often used in applied economics7.
Typically a great deal of questions regarding wages and how they change
for subgroups (like temporary and permanent contracts) and in time are
answered using decomposition methods aimed at quantifying the contri-
bution of various factors. Starting with the seminal papers of Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973) this methods has become a standard tool kit
for labour economics. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is a paramet-
ric, linear decomposition of the mean difference:
Y 1−Y 0 = (X1β1−X1β0)+(X1β0−X0β0)
= (β1−β0)X1+(X1−X0)β0
where the total mean difference is decomposed in the effect of changes
in the characteristics of the two groups and the effect of changes in the
coefficients, or the unexplained part. The original method proposed by
Oaxaca and Blinder has been improved and expanded upon over the
years and the most important development has been the extension of
the decomposition methods to distributional parameters other than the
mean (Fortin et al. (2011), Chernozhukov et al. (2013), DiNardo et al.
(1996), Machado & Mata (2005), Autor et al. (2005)). Subsequently
7Magnani & Zhu (2012), (Elder et al., 2010), Biewen & Jenkins (2005).
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the difference in the observed wage distributions described above can be
decomposed as:
FY1|X1 −FY0|X0 =
[
FY1|X1 −F∗Y1|X0
]
+
[
F∗Y1|X0 −FY0|X0
]
(1.4)
where the first term in brackets is a composition effect due to differences
in characteristics between the two groups and the second term repre-
sents unexplained differences which, in the context of labour market,
are traced back to changes in the wage structure. This new set of meth-
ods are well suited to explore the rising in inequalities of incomes and
wages that occurred in the developed countries in the last decades since,
once the counterfactual distribution is estimated, the decomposition can
be applied to all functions of the distributions, including quantiles and,
for example, Gini coefficients. This is one of the advantages that induced
us to use this methodology. They can be divided in methods based on
manipulation of the conditional distribution or of the covariates distri-
bution defined in Eq.1.3. They can also be divided regarding how much
parametric the approach is. Chernozhukov et al. (2013) provides an es-
timation and the inference procedure for a regression method applied
to the conditional distribution of the outcome. Inspired by the hazard
model suggested by Donald et al. (2000), they use a distribution regres-
sion method where the link function is a Logit model for each value of y
to obtain the distribution for one group. Then the counterfactual distri-
bution is obtained averaging. An unrestricted non-parametric estimator
(they used simply the empirical distribution function) is used for the
covariates distribution. They obtain uniformly consistent and asymp-
totically Gaussian estimators. Also the methods proposed by Machado
& Mata (2005) and Melly (2005), described before, can be considered in
this group of methods, but with linear quantile regression. In fact they
both compare the two marginal distributions, the real and the counter-
factual, to obtain the wage structure effect and compute the composition
effect by difference with the overall change. However, as noted before,
with the estimation of coefficients it is not possible to calculate other
statistics of the distribution. Magnani & Zhu (2012) combine the mean
decomposition method by Fortin (2008) with the unconditional quantile
regression by Firpo et al. (2009) to decompose gender wage differential at
different quantiles. On a total different approach DiNardo et al. (1996)
do not take into account the conditional distribution but estimate di-
rectly both the marginal and the counterfactual with a semi-parametric
procedure closer to the reweighting schemes seen in the beginning of the
chapter. This is the method that we decided to exploit for our empirical
application. Its peculiarities and how it has been adapted to the Italian
18 CHAPTER 1. BEYOND THE MEAN
case will be described in Chapter 3. Generally speaking it is possible
to say that one of the advantages of the re-weighting approach is that
it does not assume any functional form for the relation connecting the
covariates to the distribution of the outcome and is one of the reasons
it was chosen.
To conclude it is worth noting that one difference between decom-
position exercises and proper programme evaluation is that the compo-
sition effect is a key component of interest for the former, while it is a
selection bias resulting from a confounding factor to be controlled for in
the latter. On the other hand the residual factor is what concern the
most the evaluator since, under proper independence assumptions, can
represent a measure of the impact of a programme. In our example the
residual factor can be seen as a wage penalty imputable to the type of
contract. As pointed out by Fortin et al. (2011), a second limit regards
the fact that these methods are useful to shed light on how much each
factor accounts in the changes in the outcome variable but they may not
clarify the mechanisms underlying the relationship between factor and
outcomes. That means that are useful in indicating which explanation
is to be explored in more detail but not how this explanation work. The
literature on inequalities is developing in this sense, since the disentan-
gle of the differences can give a more structural interpretation on the
decomposition. In the following Chapter we will introduce the empirical
problem that is at the base of this work.
Chapter2
Recent Developments for the
Labour Market
2.1 Introduction
As anticipated before, the initial idea around this work deals with
an empirical evidence: since the early 1990’s Italy underwent a drastic
process of reforms concerning the regulation of working agreements that
deeply changed the structure of the labour market. Just a little after, the
biggest economic crisis of recent history stroke, bringing along long-term
consequences especially for the Mediterranean countries in the Europe
zone. What are the implications of these two major events on the dis-
tribution of salaries is still a topic of research, not only in Italy but in
Europe as well. Indeed policy-makers and labour economists have been
wildly concerned with changes in wage distributions, raising inequalities,
and the effects of changes in the structure of the labour market. In this
Chapter we will present a brief introduction of the economic context and
describe the reforms and trends that have characterized the evolution of
the labour market, especially for Italy. Some explicative cases are pre-
sented as well. The aim is to better understand the framework around
which the evaluation of both temporary contracts and economic crisis
effects is presented later.
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2.2 Institutional reforms and the Labour Market
According to Boeri (2011) labour market institutions are defined
”as the systems of laws, norms or conventions resulting from a collec-
tive choice, i.e. a by-product of the political process”. They provide
incentives or limitations to influence individual choices over labour and
payments, impacting on the structure of labour markets. Institutional
reforms are consequently defined as changes in the institutions settings
that can potentially affect the structure of markets (Boeri, 2011). Indeed
one of the biggest reform, and object of primary interest in this research,
that took place all over Europe since the beginning of the 1990’s has been
the process of ”flexibilisation” of the labour market through the progres-
sive spread and deregulation of temporary working agreements. These
reforms are mainly partial, meaning that they are introduced with a
phasing-in method that affects only a subset of the population. Thanks
to these characteristics we can fit in a recent trend in the literature that
has been evaluating the effects of labour market institutions on wages,
exploiting this kind of reforms as natural experiments (Boeri, 2011).
2.2.1 Job insecurity and Structural Factors
In comparison with other European countries, Italy was a latecomer
in the process of ”flexibilisation” of the labour market trough institu-
tional reforms1 (Bolelli, 2017). However according to the Employment
Outlook of OECD of 2004 (OECD, 2018a), after more then ten years of
reforms, our country had relaxed national employment protection legis-
lation more than other countries. Indeed the process started in the early
ninety’s and reached its peak in 2014 when the reform, known as Jobs
Act, introduced a lighter dismissal regime for future long-term contracts,
and reduced the sanctions on collective and unfair dismissal procedures
(Bolelli, 2017). Generally speaking the tool used to increase flexibility
and deregulation in the market has been the introduction in the legis-
lation of non-standard, temporary contracts. This strategy contributed
to create a double-tier regime in which only standard workers saw their
protection legislation remaining almost intact. Indeed flexibility was in-
troduced into the Italian system by the margins (Commission, 2006b).
The new working arrangements allow employers to bypass the strong
labour protection legislation and collective bargain of permanent con-
1Labour market flexibility is defined as the capability to respond to changes
in market conditions, like supply and demand or wage rate (Boeri, 2011).
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tracts, saving on wages and social security obligations2 (Bolelli (2017),
Ballestrero & De Simone (2012)). This process of liberalization of work-
ing arrangements in the spirit of flexibility consequently increased the
precariousness of workers since a growing number of them were excluded
from social rights and employment protection. (McKay et al., 2012).
The increase in flexibility also implied a gradual loss of power by unions
since temporary contracts prevent them to control over conditions in
new agreements and employers right. For example the reforms gradu-
ally decreased the power of collective bargaining by marginalizing their
role in the decisions concerning the use of non-standard contracts in-
side the firm, in challenging the application of a temporary contracts or
in advocating for the permanent hiring for temporary workers (Bolelli
(2017), Ballestrero & De Simone (2012)). This progressive erosion of
labour power though is not only attributed to labour legislation reforms
but it is also attributed to structural factors like the harshness of the
economic crisis that hit with a negative impact on working conditions
(European Parliament(2016), Bolelli (2017)).
The Great Recession was trigged by a financial meltdown and from
the United States it spread all over the world. It has proven to be the
worst in intensity and length since the Great Depression of 1929 and,
because of its consequences, it reminded the researchers how deeply im-
portant and complicated is the behaviour of labour markets over the
business cycle (Elsby et al., 2016). Indeed M. Andersen (2011) studied
how labour markets characterised by flexibilisation can cope with the
consequences of the Great Recession finding out that short term unem-
ployment constitutes a relatively large share of overall unemployment
in comparison to long-term unemployment but this must be associated
with social safety net and active labour market policies with some con-
cerns for the efficiency of the system in the long run. Bentolila et al.
(2012) found out that Spain, whose labour market is characterised by
high levels of temporary contracts and light employment protection leg-
islation, could have avoided about 45% of its unemployment surge had it
2From a business perspective, such arrangements may provide attractive
flexibility. From the perspective of workers, they may offer paid employment
to some who would otherwise be unemployed and appeal to others who do
not want to be tied down to a rigid work schedule, yet also may lack many of
the benefits and protections afforded by traditional jobs. Employment rights
and protections refer to statutory minimum standards of employment such
as minimum wage, overtime pay, hours of work limits, public holidays, paid
vacations, notice of termination, and job protection for maternity or parental
leave.
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adopted French more strict employment protection legislation. Arpaia
& Curci (2010) point out also that the negative effects of the Reces-
sion have hit harder some socio-economic groups: males, workers with
weaker contract agreements, less skilled, members of ethnic minorities
and the young. In the light of these findings it seemed foremost impor-
tant to evaluate the effects of the job market structure, especially the
new type of employment legislations, and specific personal characteris-
tic to quantify the determinants of this heterogeneous response to the
crisis, focusing in particular on effects on wages. Indeed policy makers
and labour economists have been really concern also with changes in the
wage distribution and inequality occured during and after the economic
crisis and the implications of the new institutional reforms.
2.3 Recent Topics on Wage Inequalities
Literature on evaluation of wage inequalities grew systematically in
the last decades motivated initially by the increased interest on the topic
in the United States occurred at the beginning of the 1980’s. Europe
as well has faced a similar pattern but with many peculiarities for each
state. Typically explanations have been looked for in changes in the
structure of the labour market, like the institutions described above,
or in changes in the characteristics of the workers, or a combinations
of both. For example Gosling et al. (2000) used U.K micro-data to
describe the increase in education differentials for males and a rise in
within-group dispersion. Both DiNardo et al. (1996) and Chernozhukov
et al. (2013) applied their methodology to study the evolution of U.S
wage distribution during this period. They both stressed the role of
de-unionisation, but DiNardo et al. (1996) found that also shocks on
supply and demand were main factors in explaining inequality, while
Chernozhukov et al. (2013) insisted more on the decline of the mini-
mum wage. Moreover Angrist & Pischke (2009) stated that inequality
in the U.S. has been growing asymmetrically in recent years, particu-
larly for what concerns returns of education. A large group of recent
works studied the implications of new technological changes on wages
as a possible explanation for raising inequalities and job polarisations is
one of the most popular theories beneath. Job polarisation is defined
as a shift in employment from middle to low and high income workers,
with the average wage growth slower for middle-income workers, higher
for both extremes (Barany & Siegel, 2015). In fact a rising body of
literature has been inspecting the relationship between distribution of
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wages and job polarisation. Acemoglu & Autor (2011) built a model for
skill demand and wage determination and found out that over the last
three decades in U. S. it is possible to observe a substantial decline in
real wages for low skill workers, men in particularly, a non-monotone
change in earning levels in different parts of the earning distribution,
and a job polarization of the market with increases in employment in
high skill and low skill occupations in comparison to middle skill occu-
pation. They suggest that a rapid diffusion of new technologies directly
substitutes capital for moderately skilled workers. Regarding Europe
also Goos et al. (2014) state that declines in routine intensive employ-
ment positions caused by changes in technology are the most important
factor in the rising of job polarisation. It is in fact generally accepted
among economists that this particular structure depends on the cur-
rent relationship between workers’ skills and technological progress but
how this works is still a source of debate (Katz & Autor (1999),Goos &
Manning (2007)). The theory that has been developed to explain the
driving force behind job polarisation is called task-biased technological
change: job tasks, depending on their characteristics are impacted by
technology improvements in different ways. According to this theory,
middle-skilled workers are assigned to routine tasks which are highly
at risk to be replaced, while the remaining two sub-categories with non
routine tasks (manual for low-skilled, intellectual for high-skilled) are ex-
panding since technological changes cannot replace them. In contrast,
another theory regarding structural changes in the recent history re-
gards the so called ”upgrading of occupation” (Card & DiNardo (2002),
Goldin & Katz (2007)) and is explained by a skill-biased technological
change where only the highly skilled workers manage to benefit from
technological improvements. Castellano et al. (2017) explore how both
these structural changes affect wage inequality in France (for upgrad-
ing of occupations), Germany (for job polarisation), and Italy (where
neither of the two phenomena can be clearly identified by the authors).
Regarding France and Germany, the main results highlight how the en-
dowment effect plays a key role in decreasing or, at least, not increasing
wage inequality, whereas in Italy the rising inequality may be due to
the wage structure (a lower efficiency of the country labour market in
creating better job opportunities and higher-salaries for employees are
suggested as explanations). On the other hand Garofalo et al. (2018),
investigating the comparative effects that the Great Recession had on
the structures of southern European labour markets and wage inequal-
ities, found that the capacity of the Italian labour market in rewarding
individual characteristics makes the country less unequal than Greece,
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Portugal and Spain. In fact the differences on inequalities between these
states are explained mostly by the different market structures and their
different abilities to reward skills.
Another source of wage inequality that has been inquired intensively
in the last years is the wage gap in salaries that may occur between
different group of workers like males and female, or white respect to non-
white workers. McDonald & Thornton (2011), Kunze (2005), Bhalotra
& Manuel (2018), Colella (2014) and Kim (2010) are just some examples.
In the context of this work, we are particularly interested in the pre-
vious little literature that inquiry the wage gap for temporary workers
especially for the Italian context where this major reform took place as
explained above. Santangelo (2011) evaluates whether temporary con-
tracts suffer a wage penalty comparing European countries in the context
prior of the Great Recession using data from 2007 and the method pro-
posed by Firpo (2007). She found a wage penalty raging from 13,4% and
7% regarding especially low-earning workers. Comi & Grasseni (2012)
and Bosio (2013), using different approaches find equal results. The first
use a QR model of Koenker & Bassett (1978) while the latter relaxes
the assumption of exogenity for temporary contracts and uses the ap-
proach of Frölich & Melly (2013) using the staggered implementation of
the reforms as instrumental variable. Both of the works suggest the idea
that temporary contracts have increased a segmentation of the labour
market in two groups, one with permanent, higher paid workers and
one composed of badly paid temporary jobs in which low-skilled and
young workers are segregated in. Unfortunately these studies refer to
the period prior the crisis so more research is needed to inquiry how the
impact of this type of contracts has changed over the years.
2.4 Changes in the Italian Labour Market
Hereinafter some descriptive statistics are presented to show some
changes in the Italian labour market occurred between 2007 and 2013,
the reference period we choose to include the Great Recession. In Tab.
2.1 is reported in percentage the share of population by activity status,
also divided by sub-groups. Generally speaking and not surprisingly,the
share of population at work has declined of two percentage points while
the percentage of unemployed has risen of almost four points. Between
men and women, only the formers saw a decline of the share of working
people (-5,5%). Regarding the share of unemployed people, men suffer
a bigger increase (6,5% compared with the 1,1% of women) in line with
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the findings presented in the previous paragraph. Looking at age classes,
while unemployment shares have risen of similar amounts for each class
(around 4%), it is worth noting that, also in our country, the youngest
cohort show the biggest decline in people at work (-10,5%) with the
biggest rise in the share of inactive people (6,6%). The oldest cohort
present a rise of 8,3% in the share of people at work and a decline of
11,3% in the share of people in retirement showing a change in the retire-
ment scheme. Regarding education, the group with the lowest level of
education presents a bigger drop (-7,4%) in the share of working people
compared to the other two categories (-4,6% and -2,1% for medium and
high education respectively). The same picture appears for the unem-
ployed share, with an increase of 6,2% for lows, a plus 3,9% for medium
and 0,5% for high educated people. On the topic of skill levels (where
1 indicates the lower level and 4 the highest one) it is possible to notice
that from level 1 to 3 the decline in the share of people at work is little
less then -2% while the top level present a much lower decline of -0,7%,
suggesting more an upgrading of occupations then a job polarisation-
type of change for the structure of the market (Castellano et al., 2017).
Unemployment shares also differ: +7,9% for level 1, +6,6% for level 2,
+2,4% for level 3 and +1,5% for level 4. Shares of skill-level groups for
each year are also plotted in Fig. 2.1.
To give a more complete picture Fig. 2.2 represents the shares of
active population by economic activity classified according to the NACE
classification (ILO, 2011) for both years. It is possible to notice that the
biggest drop is shown in the sectors of Mining and Manufacturing and
Constructions.
Given this overview of the economic context and the empirical prob-
lem we are dealing with, we shall proceed presenting the methodology
chosen and applied to this case.
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Figure 2.1: Share of Active Population by Skill Level
Figure 2.2: Share of Active Population by Economic Activity
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Chapter3
Decomposition of Differences in
Wage Distributions
3.1 The counterfactual setting
Following DiNardo et al. (1996) and reconnecting with the first chap-
ter, we can set our framework defining a wage distribution f (w), a set of
job-related covariates X and two groups of workers denoted with D= 1
and D= 0 where the first one represents workers with a temporary con-
tract, and the second group refers to individuals that work under a
permanent agreement. The density of wages for a group of workers,
fD(w), can be written as:
fD(w) =
∫
x∈Ωx
dF(w,x,D= d)
=
∫
x∈Ωx
f (w|x,D= d)dF(x|D= d)
= f (wd ;xd)
(3.1)
where f (wd=1;zd=1) and f (wd=0;xd=0) represent the observed distribu-
tion functions of wages and job-related covariates for the two groups.
We are interested in the counterfactual density that represents what
would be the distribution of wages in the group of workers with a tem-
porary contract if they had the same job-related characteristics of the
group of permanent workers. As discussed in the first chapter, this kind
of counterfactual is essential to perform the decomposition of the dif-
ferences in the distributions. The counterfactual density f c(wd=1;xd=0)
29
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can then be formally written as
f c(wd=1;xd=0) =
=
∫
f (w|x,d = 1)dF(x|d = 0) (3.2)
We will proceed discussing the assumptions required for the identifica-
tion of this quantity and the estimation method used in this work.
3.1.1 General Assumptions
To discuss assumption and identification issues we follow the setting
and the notation provided by Fortin et al. (2011). Even if it can appear
redundant, a first important thing to point out is that we refer to the
case where the groups of individuals we are comparing are mutually
exclusive 1:
Assumption 1. Mutually exclusive groups: the population of interest can
be divided into two mutually exclusive groups denoted with D = 1, for
individuals with a temporary contract, and D = 0, for individuals with
a permanent contract.
From now on the distribution function denoted as FYd |Dr will repre-
sents the distribution of the potential outcome Yd for workers in group
r that is observed when d = r and counterfactual when d 6= r.
Assumption 2. Structural Form: A worker belonging to either group
d = 0 or d = 1 is paid according to the wage structure m1 and m0 which
are functions of the workers’ observables (X) and unobservables (ε):
Y1i = m1(Xi,εi) and Y0i = m0(Xi,εi) (3.3)
where εi has a conditional distribution given X Fε|X and d = 1,0.
The assumption suggests that three sources of variation can produce
differences between the wage distributions of the two groups: the wage
setting function m(·), the distribution of observables fX(x) and the dis-
tribution of unobservables fε(ε). The aim of the decomposition in the
evaluation literature is to separate the contribution of the wage structure
(the treatment effect) from the two others.
1Even though most of the empirical literature fall in this case it is important
to distinguish with the few cases regarding overlapping groups.
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Assumption 3. Simple Counterfactual Treatment: A counterfactual wage
structure mc is said to correspond to a simple counterfactual treatment
when it can be assumed that mc(·) = md(·) for workers in group r.
This assumption implies that the alternative wage structure m∗(·)
that represents how workers would be paid if there were no temporary
contracts does not exist and that we can assume no general equilib-
rium effects. This is quite an important one and deserve some further
discussion especially because of this particular economic context.
3.1.2 Identification
So far we established a general setting. Then we can move to the
assumptions that are required for identification in our case:
Assumption 4. Overlapping Support: ∀X ,ε it is valid that
0< Pr[Dg = 1|X = x,E = ε]< 1
This means that both groups of workers have the same set of work-
related covariates (this assumption might not be valid for example when
one investigates the wage gap between immigrant and citizen workers).
Assumption 5. Ignorability: For D = {1,0} let (Dd ,X ,ε) have a joint
distribution. For all x in X , ε is independent of D given X = x
D⊥ ε|X (3.4)
This assumption impose that ε has the same conditional distribu-
tion across groups so the difference between a wage distribution and its
counterfactual depends solely on differences in the wage structure. In
the evaluation literature this assumption is also known as selection on
observables.
Proposition 3.1. Identification of Aggregate Decomposition: Under the
assumption of simple counterfactual, overlapping support, and ignora-
bility, the overall wage gap can be decomposed in:
∆O = ∆S+∆X (3.5)
where the difference in the wage structure ∆S reflect the differences be-
tween the structural functions md(·) and the difference in the distribution
of characteristics ∆X is referred as the composition effect.
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When the simple counterfactual and ignorability are satisfied the
conditional distribution of Y given X is invariant from manipulations of
the marginal distribution of covariates. It follows that equation 3.2 is
a proper counterfactual for the distribution of wages that would have
prevailed if workers with temporary contracts would have been paid
according to the wage structure of permanent ones.
For the purpose of this work we need another assumption:
Assumption 6. Invariance of Conditional Distribution: The construction
of the counterfactual wage distribution for workers of group 1 that would
have prevailed if they were paid like group 0 workers, assumes that the
conditional wage distribution FY1|X ,D(y|X = x) remains valid when the
marginal distribution FX |D1 replaces FX |D0
This holds as it holds 3 and 5 and there are no general equilibrium
effects.
3.2 Reweighing Kernel Estimation
Before proceeding with the estimation procedure we need to intro-
duce another statistical tool, the Kernel density estimate fˆh of a uni-
variate density f based on a random sample W1, · · · ,Wn of size n with
weights θ1, · · · ,θn that sum up to one, which can be defined as:
fˆh(w) =
n
∑
i=1
θi
h
K
(
w−Wi
h
)
, (3.6)
where h is the bandwidth and K(·) is the Kernel function. The critical
issue in kernel density estimation is the choice of bandwidth Li & Racine
(2006). The kernel function used is Gaussian while the weights θi are all
equal to 12. Actually non-parametric kernel density estimation methods
are not new in the study of treatment heterogeneity in a variety of
economic fields: Hu & Hibel (2015), Henderson et al. (2006), Henderson
et al. (2011), Rothe (2010) and Zhu (2011) are some examples.
3.2.1 A two-term decomposition
DiNardo et al. (1996) prove that the counterfactual density f (wt=1;xt=0)
can be written in terms of the observable distribution f (wd=1;xd=1) with
2DFL uses the sample weights multiplied by usual hours of work and nor-
malized to sum to one.
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the help of a proper reweighting function to counterbalance the different
distribution of covariates in the two groups. More formally:
f (wd=1;xd=0) =
=
∫
f (w|x,d = 1)dF(x|d = 0)
=
∫
f (w|x,d = 1)ψx(x)dF(x|d = 1)
(3.7)
where the reweighting function ψx(x) is defined as
ψx(x) =
dF(x|d = 0)
dF(x|d = 1) =
Pr(x|d = 0)
Pr(x|d = 1) (3.8)
Since we are dealing with a ratio of multivariate probabilities that would
be difficult to estimate especially when the number of covariates is big,
it is useful to apply the Bayes’ rule and trace back the quantity to a
ratio of univariate probabilities:
ψx(x) =
Pr(x|d = 0)
Pr(x|d = 1) =
Pr(d = 0|x)
Pr(d = 1|x) ·
Pr(d = 1)
Pr(d = 0)
(3.9)
Both Pr(d|z) and Pr(d) can be easily estimated with a standard Probit
model. Once ψˆx(x) is estimated it is possible to calculate the counterfac-
tual distribution f (wt=1;xt=0) applying the reweighting function to the
standard kernel estimator:
fˆ (wt=1;xt=0) = fˆh(w) =
n
∑
i=1
θi
h
ψˆz(z)K
(
w−Wi
h
)
, (3.10)
where θi are the sample weights, h is the optimal bandwidth and K(·) is
a Gaussian kernel.
Since we are interested in decomposing the wage differentials be-
tween the two groups of workers we can use the estimated counterfactual
and apply the following sequential decomposition:
fd=1(w)− fd=0(w) =
= f (wd=1,zd=1)− f (wd=1,zd=0)
+ f (wd=1,zd=0)− f (wd=0,zd=0)
(3.11)
As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the first line indicates the ef-
fect of changes in the job related characteristics, the composition effect,
and the second line the residual factors or discrimination effect which
correspond to the causal effect of this kind of precarious contracts on
the structure of salaries.
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3.2.2 A Comparison Over Time
Since 2008 has been a dramatic turning point for the world economic
system it is important to to expand the analysis of wage differentials be-
tween the years before and after the economic crisis. We now consider
two new group of workers and consequentially two distribution of wages
f2013(w) and f2007(w) . We are now interested in a counterfactual of the
kind ”What would the density of wages have been in 2013 if workers’
attributes had remained at their 2007 level?”. In this scenario workers’
attributes are represented by a vector z = (d,x) where d is a dummy
variable indicating the type of contract and x are other job-related char-
acteristics.
The density of wages at one point in time, ft(w), can be written as
the integral of the density of wages conditional on the set of individual
attributes and one date f (w|z, tw), over the distribution of individual
attributes F(z|tz) at date tz:
ft(w) =
∫
z∈Ωz
dF(w,z|tw,z = t)
=
∫
z∈Ωz
f (w|z, tw = t)dF(z|tz = t)
= f (w; tw = t, tz = t)
(3.12)
where Ωz is the domain of definition of the individual attributes. While
f (w; tw = 2013, tz = 2013) represents the actual density of wages in 2013,
f (w; tw = 2013, tz = 2007) represents the density of wages that would have
prevailed in 2013 had the distribution of individual attributes remained
as it was in 2007. Under the assumption that the 2013 structure of wages,
which is represented by the conditional density f (w|z, tw = 2013), does
not depend on the distribution of attributes, the hypothetical density
f (w; tw = 2013, tz = 2007)3 is defined as:
f (w; tw = 2013, tz = 2007) =
=
∫
f (w|z, tw = 2013)dF(z|tz = 2007)
=
∫
f (w|z, tw = 2013)ψz(z)dF(z|tz = 2013)
(3.13)
3This counterfactual density represent the density that would have prevailed
if individual attributes had remained at their 2007 level and workers had been
paid according to the wage schedule observed in 2013, since we ignore the
impact of changes in the distribution of x on the structure of wages in general
equilibrium
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where the reweighting function ψz(z) is now defined as
ψz(z) =
dF(z|tz = 2007)
dF(z|tz = 2013) (3.14)
Again equation (3.13) shows that the counterfactual density is identical
to the 2013 density except for the function ψz(z). Once the estimate
ψˆz(z) is obtained, it can be used to find the counterfactual density. The
difference between the actual 2013 density and its counterfactual density
represents the effect of changes in the distribution of workers’ attributes.
Given our focus on temporary contracts, it would be useful though to
account for d and x separately.
Following DiNardo et al. (1996) the density of wages that would have
prevailed if temporary contracts, but not other attributes, had remained
at their 2007 level is constructed, then a counterfactual where both d and
x had remained at their 2007 level is considered. Since the distribution
of attributes at one point in time can be written as the product of two
distributions:
F(z|tz = t) = F(d|x, td|x = t) ·F(x|tx = t) (3.15)
equation (3.13) can be used to re-write the density of wages in 2013
as:
f (w; tw = 2013, td|x = 2013, tx = 2013) =
=
∫ ∫
f (w|d,x, tw = 2013)dF(d|x, td|x = 2013)dF(x|tx = 2013)
(3.16)
Under the assumption that the conditional density f (w|d,x, tw) does not
depend on the temporary contract status, the density that would have
prevailed in 2013 if temporary contract, but none of the other attributes,
had remained at its 2007 level can be written as a reweighted version of
the 2013 density:
f (w; tw = 2013, td|x = 2007, tx = 2013)
=
∫ ∫
f (w|d,x, tw = 2013)dF(d|x, td|x = 2007)dF(x|tx = 2013)
=
∫ ∫
f (w|d,x, tw = 2013)ψd|x(d,x)dF(d|x, td|x = 2013)dF(x|tx = 2013)
(3.17)
36CHAPTER 3. DECOMPOSITION OF DIFFERENCES INWAGEDISTRIBUTIONS
where ψd|x(d,x) is the reweighting function defined as
ψd|x(d,x) =
dF(d|x, td|x = 2007)
dF(d|x, td|x = 2013
= d · Pr(d = 1|x, td|x = 2007)
Pr(d = 1|x, td|x = 2013)
+ [1−d] · Pr(d = 0|x, td|x = 2007)
Pr(d = 0|x, td|x = 2013)
(3.18)
An estimate of the reweighting function ψd|x(d,x) can be obtained by
estimating the conditional probability Pr(d = 1|x, td|x) for td|x = 2007 and
td|x = 2013 using a Probit model.
To account also for the role of attributes in the changes of the wage
distributions in the two years, we consider the density of wages that
would have prevailed in 2013 if the distribution of both d and x had
remained as in 2007
f (w; tw = 2013, td|x = 2007, tx = 2007)
=
∫ ∫
f (w|d,x, tw = 2013)dF(d|x, td|x = 2007)dF(x|tx = 2007)
=
∫ ∫
f (w|d,x, tw = 2013)ψd|x(d,x)dF(d|x, td|x = 2013)ψx(x)
×dF(x|tx = 2013)
(3.19)
where
ψx(x) =
dF(x|tx = 2007)
dF(x|tx = 2013)
=
Pr(tx = 2007|x)
Pr(tx = 2013|x) ·
Pr(tx = 2013)
Pr(tx = 2007)
(3.20)
for Bayes’ rule. Again these conditional probabilities can be estimated
with a Probit model. We can then apply the following sequential de-
composition:
f2013(w)− f2007(w) =
= f (w;tw = 13,td|x = 13,tx = 13)− f (w;tw = 13,td|x = 07,tx = 13)+
+ f (w;tw = 13,td|x = 07,tx = 13)− f (w;tw = 13,td|x = 07,tx = 07)+
+ f (w; tw = 13,td|x = 07,tx = 07)− f (w;tw = 07,td|x = 07,tx = 07)
(3.21)
where the second line indicates the ”effect” of changes in the level of
temporary contracts, the third line the ”effect” of changes in the distri-
bution of all other attributes, and the last line the residual factors, i.e.
the change in the structure of labour market after the economic crisis.
3.2. REWEIGHING KERNEL ESTIMATION 37
3.2.3 Distribution of Summary Statistics
Sometimes it is interesting to observe changes not only on the entire
distribution of an outcome but also for general distributional measures
that can be significant in summing up the results. The assumptions
that has been discussed here are valid, as proved by Fortin et al. (2011),
also for some statistics of the distribution defined as ν(FYd |Dr) where ν :
Fν →R is a real-valued functional and whereFν is a class of distribution
functions such that FYd |Dr ∈Fν if |ν(FYd |Dr)|<∞,d,r = 0,1 (Fortin et al.,
2011). DiNardo et al. (1996) and Chernozhukov et al. (2013) also include
in their estimation of counterfactual distributions, the computation of
some of these statistics. In our work we will consider two measures
calculated from the counterfactual distribution f ∗: the quantiles of the
distribution wτ defined as
wτ :=
∫ wτ
0
f ∗(w)dw= τ (3.22)
and the Gini coefficient
GF∗ = 1−2
∫
w
L(w,F∗W )dw (3.23)
calculated from the Lorenz curve as the ratios of partial means to overall
means:
L(w,F∗W ) =
∫
w 1(w˜< w)dF
∗(w˜)∫
w w˜dF∗(w˜)
(3.24)
In the following Chapter we will presents the results of the empirical
analysis together with the description of the data and the sample. The
decomposition results and some significant conclusions will be provided.
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Chapter4
Empirical Analysis
4.1 The EU-SILC Data
The European Union-Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) is the EU reference source for micro data on income, poverty,
social exclusion and living conditions both at household and individual
level. The dataset includes internationally and cross-temporary compa-
rable variables for all EU Member States and some other counties. It
was launched in 2004 in 13 Member States1. From 2005 onwards the
data are available for all EU25 Member States plus Island and Norway2.
4.1.1 Reference population and sample design
The reference population of EU-SILC is defined as ”all private house-
holds and all persons aged 16 and over within the household residing in
the territory of the Member States at the time of data collection. Persons
living in collective households and in institutions are generally excluded
from the target population. For practical reasons, small parts of the na-
tional territory may also not be covered in the survey (e.g. the French
Overseas Departments and territories; Scotland north of the Caledonian
Canal and the Scilly Islands)”(Eurostat, 2018). EU-SILC data are col-
lected by National Statistical Institutes, for Italy ISTAT is in charge,
and could come from different sources. The information are stored in
1Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden plus in Norway and IS
2Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Czech Republic have launched EU-SILC
in 2006.
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four different datasets: the Household register, the Household data file,
the Personal register and the Personal data file with the possibility of
matching them together.
EU-SILC is a complex survey involving different sampling designs
in different countries and the sample design for Italy could be assimi-
lated to a two stage stratified type3. Unfortunately, important sample
design variables are missing in the EU-SILC User Database (UDB) and
previous studies have shown that neglecting the sample design can lead
to an underestimation of standard errors (Goedemé, 2013). Goedemé
(2010) analyses extensively the quality of the standard errors. He shows
that for variables calculated at household level (like income and poverty
measures) accounting for clustering within households is of paramount
importance but taking as much as possible account of the entire sample
design generally leads to more accurate estimates, even if sample de-
sign variables are partially lacking. Even though this analysis focuses
on variables collected at individual level we still take account for the
sample design.
4.1.2 Variables of interest
Since the Great Recession began between 2008 and 2009, we choose
2007 cross-sectional wave to represent the status of the labour market
before the crisis. As the reference year for the post crises situation we
choose the 2013 cross-sectional wave , with a seven year gap in between,
since in Europe the effects were more enduring than in the U.S (Com-
mission, 2013a). With this selection we might be able to capture the
changes brought along by this turning-point event. We decided to focus
on workers wages, in particular on gross monthly earnings for employees.
It corresponds to the monthly amount in the main job for employees be-
fore tax and social insurance contributions deduction. It includes salary,
tips and commission but excludes income from investments-assets, sav-
ings, stocks and shares. If a person receives, as a part of a salary,
supplementary payments (13th or 14th month payments), or payments
such as holiday pay, profit share, bonuses, these payments are taken
into account on a monthly basis. Only monetary earnings are taken into
3The first stage units (or primary sampling units PSU) are the municipali-
ties, the second stage units (SSU) are the households. The PSU are stratified
according to their size in terms of number of residents. Stratification is carried
out inside each administrative region. Four municipalities are selected in each
stratum. Municipalities are clusters of households, households are clusters of
individuals.
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account (Eurostat, 2018). Using available information on how many
months are spent in paid work and how may hours are worked per week,
a new wage-per-hour variable has been calculated and logarithmically
transformed to be used as the outcome variable of interest. Moreover
wages have been adjusted using ISTAT FOI index, i.e. the consumer
price index for worker-headed households, to make comparable the 2007
and 2013 surveys.
As covariates I make use of the following individual variables: gen-
der, age level, education level, skills, experience, full-time or part-time
status, a managerial position dummy, the dimension of the local unit,
the job sector, being an immigrant, marital status, number of children
and five regional dummies. Education level was build upon the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) and recoded to
fit a three-level variable. The first level includes people with a a de-
gree up to a lower secondary education, the second level includes upper
secondary and post-secondary (but non tertiary) degrees, and the third
level encompass individual that graduated from a first or second stage
of tertiary education (UNESCO, 2011). As defined by International
Labour Organization (ILO), skill is the ability to carry out tasks and
duties of a given job. Moreover skill level is measured operationally
by considering the nature of the work performed, the level of formal
education completed and the informal on-the-job-training (ILO, 2011).
The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ex ISCO-88,
now ISCO-084) defines four levels of skills that remained comparable
after the new coding. They go from elementary occupations (level 1)
to highly professional positions (level 4) and are used as a variable for
skill level. Experience is defined upon years of work experience, age is
divided in five classes and the marital status is a three-level variable for
people who have never been married, people who are currently married
or living with a partner, and people who used to be married (separated,
divorced, widowed). The job sector is defined according to the Statis-
tical classification of economic activities in the European Community
(NACE) in a way that the 2007 and 2013 are comparable.
I excluded from the analysis individuals aged under 15 and individu-
als aged over 65. I also excluded people in the armed forces. The sample
is thus composed by working employed individuals and contains 14365
observations in 2007 and 11569 in 2013. The selection of 2007 and 2013
as the reference years allows to analyse the social and economic scenarios
along the global crisis.
4from 2011
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4.2 Descriptive statistic of sample
Here we present some descriptive statistics of the sample, divided by
type of contract and years5. Starting with Tab. 4.1, the composition of
the sample, we can see that the share of women shows a rise between
2007 and 2013, for both types of contracts, in line with the fact that
the share of unemployed people growth especially for men (see Tab.2.1).
Regarding age classes it is evident that the share of young workers (first
and second cohort) have a drop in respect to older groups, reflecting
again the differences shown in Tab.2.1 for unemployment and inactive
shares. It is worth noting that within permanent workers, the youngest
cohort is less than 7% in both years, while within the temporary group
the share is more than 20%. Low educated people also suffered a drop in
the sample between the two years while the presence of highly educated
ones rises. This trend is reproduced inside the two groups of workers as
well. Talking about skills, in 2013 the share of workers belonging to the
lowest level increases the share in the temporary contracts’ group of 3
percentage points while it remains stable in the other one. In general, for
2013, the lower and the higher skill groups see an increase in their share,
while the medium-high skilled group suffered a 5% drop. This might be
a first indication of the presence of job-polarisation type of change for
the structure of the market. While the general share of Italian and non-
Italian workers remains stable across years, a shift of proportions inside
the temporary group can be noticed, with a rise in the share of non
citizen workers. Finally an increase of 3% is present also for the share
of workers under a part-time schedule, and it regards both temporary
and permanent contracts.
If we compare means of the log of hourly wages in Tab.4.2 it is
possible to notice that in both years the mean for permanent workers in
all the sub-groups is higher than their counterparts with a temporary
arrangement. If we compare each group of workers within the two years
it possible to notice that both suffered a decrease in the mean value of
the log wages but the bigger drop occurred for the temporary group, in
particular for young, high educated, low skilled and full time sub-groups.
When we observe Gini coefficients in Tab. 4.3 we can see that the
inequality is generally higher for the temporary workers in both years
and for every sub-group. Within the temporary workers, the time com-
parison shows a bigger increase especially for males, young, low educated
and low skilled workers.
5Our data sources were EUSILC UDB 2013 - Version of January 2016 and
EUSILC UDB - Version of August 2011
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Table 4.1: Percentage of Personal Characteristics
Permanent Contract Temporary Contract All Population
Gender 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013
Female 39,8% 45,1% 50,4% 48,5% 41,5% 45,6%
Male 60,2% 54,9% 49,6% 51,5% 58,5% 54,4%
Age class
15 - 25 6,8% 4,1% 24,0% 20,5% 9,6% 6,4%
25 - 35 27,2% 20,5% 35,1% 33,1% 28,5% 22,2%
35 - 45 32,9% 32,7% 24,6% 25,4% 31,5% 31,7%
45 - 55 26,3% 31,4% 13,2% 15,0% 24,2% 29,1%
55 - 65 6,9% 11,4% 3,1% 5,9% 6,3% 10,6%
Education
Low 6,1% 2,7% 9,5% 6,0% 6,7% 3,1%
Medium 76,4% 75,9% 74,6% 75,4% 76,1% 75,9%
High 17,5% 21,4% 15,9% 18,6% 17,2% 21,0%
Skills
Level 1 9,5% 9,5% 17,0% 20,5% 10,7% 11,0%
Level 2 53,3% 54,4% 56,6% 57,0% 53,8% 54,7%
Level 3 24,5% 18,3% 18,2% 9,5% 23,5% 17,1%
Level 4 12,7% 17,9% 8,3% 13,1% 12,0% 17,2%
Citizen
No 93,0% 93,1% 86,5% 88,9% 92,4% 92,5%
Yes 6,4% 6,9% 13,5% 11,1% 7,6% 7,5%
Schedule
Part- Time 10,1% 14,0% 24,8% 26,5% 12,5% 15,7%
Full - Time 89,9% 86,1% 75,2% 73,5% 87,5% 84,3%
Marital Status
Never Married 30,4% 29,6% 50,3% 53,4% 33,7% 32,8%
Married 61,4% 61,1% 44,1% 40,2% 58,6% 58,2%
Was Married 8,1% 9,33% 5,7% 6,4% 7,7% 8,9%
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Table 4.2: Mean of Log of Hourly Wages by Sub-Groups
Mean of Log of Hourly Wages
Permanent Contract Temporary Contract
2007 2013 2007 2013
Gender
Female 2,41 2,36 2,16 2,05
Male 2,47 2,46 2,15 2,08
Age class
15 - 25 2,08 2,10 2,00 1,95
25 - 35 2,34 2,30 2,20 2,11
35 - 45 2,48 2,43 2,23 2,10
45 - 55 2,56 2,48 2,16 2,09
55 - 65 2,65 2,51 2,23 2,05
Education
Low 2,26 2,12 2,02 1,92
Medium 2,38 2,36 2,11 2,04
High 2,80 2,65 2,46 2,24
Skills
Level 1 2,18 2,14 2,00 1,88
Level 2 2,33 2,32 2,10 2,04
Level 3 2,56 2,54 2,28 2,25
Level 4 2,92 2,72 2,55 2,32
Citizen
No 2,46 2,43 2,17 2,08
Yes 2,20 2,14 2,01 1,94
Schedule
Part- Time 2,30 2,29 2,12 2,06
Full - Time 2,47 2,43 2,18 2,07
Marital Status
Never Married 2,32 2,30 2,09 2,06
Married 2,51 2,47 2,23 2,08
Was Married 2,49 2,41 2,15 1,99
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Table 4.3: Gini Coefficient for of Log of Hourly Wages for SUb-
Groups
Gini Coeff. (Log of Hourly Wages)
Permanent Contract Temporary Contract
2007 2013 2007 2013
Gender
Female 0,097 0,095 0,119 0,109
Male 0,088 0,088 0,103 0,116
Age class
15 - 25 0,091 0,102 0,096 0,103
25 - 35 0,075 0,081 0,114 0,109
35 - 45 0,086 0,084 0,105 0,120
45 - 55 0,091 0,093 0,117 0,102
55 - 65 0,105 0,102 0,113 0,135
Education
Low 0,08 0,11 0,10 0,11
Medium 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,11
High 0,09 0,09 0,12 0,11
Skills
Level 1 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,12
Level 2 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,10
Level 3 0,08 0,07 0,11 0,12
Level 4 0,09 0,08 0,13 0,11
Citizen
No 0,09 0,09 0,11 0,11
Yes 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,10
Schedule
Part- Time 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,12
Full - Time 0,09 0,09 0,11 0,11
Marital Status
Never Married 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,11
Married 0,09 0,09 0,11 0,11
Was Married 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,12
46 CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.3 The Discrimination Effect of Temporary Con-
tracts
In the following paragraphs the empirical results of the semi-parametric
estimation of the counterfactuals distributions and the subsequent de-
compositions are shown. We start presenting results for 2013 only, de-
scribing what kind of wage discrimination temporary workers are suf-
fering, then we will move to the comparison over time with the aim to
characterize what structural change in the labour market has occurred
in Italy during the years 2007-2013 in the aftermath of the Great Re-
cession and to understand and their potential relationships with wage
inequality.
The decomposition results for the wage distributions of temporary
and permanent contracts in 2013 are plotted in Figure 4.1. On the
left side the real wage distribution for individuals with a temporary
contract is represented with a solid line, superimposed on the counter-
factual distribution defined in Equation 3.7 and identified by a dotted
line. This represents in a visual way the effect of changes in the distribu-
tion of individual characteristics in the two groups, also defined earlier
as composition effect. On the right side the dotted line of the counter-
factual distribution is plotted against the solid line that represent the
distribution of wages for individuals with a permanent contract. This
side of the graph shows the change in wages due only to the type of
contract, visually representing the wage penalty. Indeed the difference
between these two distribution is determined only by the type of con-
tract since other job-related characteristics are considered equal thanks
to the proper reweighting function.
To give some numerical benchmark for the changes represented in
Figure 4.1, we computed the quantiles of both the real distributions and
of the counterfactual as explained in sub-paragraph 3.2.3 so that the de-
composition of Eq. 3.7 could be applied to these quantities. The results
are presented in Table 4.4 in which the total change indicate the dif-
ference between the two real distributions (temporary contracts wages
minus permanent) at given quantiles, and the last two columns indicate
the share of variation imputable to changes in the covariates or in the
unexplained part, the wage penalty. The total changes are negative all
along the distribution, meaning that at each quantile the distribution
of wages for temporary contracts is lower and both the attributes and
the residual part contribute to lower the distribution. This means that
while there might be a difference in salaries between the two groups
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due to differences in personal endowments, still a big part of the gap is
imputable to a contractual discrimination. The fact that personal char-
acteristics are more relevant at the highest part of the wage distribution
may be a indication that for high-paid jobs temporary contracts may
work as a sort of selection method in which high skilled workers face
interim working agreements to qualify for better positions in a second
moment (Bosio, 2013). On the other hand, what has been concerning
the most is the fact that in 2013 the percentage of variation due to the
wage penalty is much stronger in the lower part of the distribution. This
first important result is consistent with the literature that identifies the
burdens of reforms that improve the flexibilisation of the labour market
only at the margins on workers at the bottom of the wage distribution.
The creation of a parallel system of working arrangements in which pro-
tections and rights are unevenly spread across them seems to produce
a discriminatory effect concentrated among workers with low skill and
low education levels. The problem with the sticky floor effect for this
kind of penalty is that a form segregation of workers is maintained in
the lower part of the wage distribution where low skilled workers (be-
cause of education, or because their age) risk to face systematically lower
wages, lesser trainings and more instability (Comi & Grasseni (2012),
Bosio (2013), Santangelo (2011)). If we repeat the same analysis sepa-
rately for 2007 (4.4) it is interesting to notice that before the economic
crisis, close to the time when this kind of contracts were introduced6,
the wage penalty was still present but was more spread along the entire
distribution.
4.3.1 Wage Penalty for sub-groups of workers
Still focusing on 2013, we now consider subgroups of workers pop-
ulation to inquiry if the wage penalty behaves differently for different
groups of people and results are presented in Table 4.5, Table 4.6 and
Table 4.7. Graphs of the wage decomposition for sub-groups are pre-
sented in Appendix (from Figure 4 to Figure 11). Taking a look at the
Table 4.5 and 4.6 it is possible to notice that, since the total change is
always negative, positive shares of change means that it is concurring to
extend the change while a negative sign of the share means it is reducing
the difference. The wage penalty for men seems to reproduce the general
effect with the share of unexplained difference bigger in the lower part
6The most important reforms in Italy were legislated between 2001 and 2003
and put in practice starting from 2005 (Bosio (2013), Bolelli (2017))
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Figure 4.1: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013
Table 4.4: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 Total Change Attributes∗ Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,405 46% 54%
25th Quantile -0,351 50% 50%
50th Quantile 0,328 60% 40%
75th Quantile -0,328 53% 47%
90th Quantile -0,346 77% 23%
2007 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,318 70% 30%
25th Quantile -0,294 63% 37%
50th Quantile -0,268 53% 47%
75th Quantile -0,278 66% 34%
90th Quantile -0,460 70% 30%
*Percentages are calculated dividing each component by the the total variation.
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of the distribution. Women on the other hand show a slightly different
pattern with the wage penalty more ”equally” spread among the distri-
bution. Results for the two middle level of skill are not so clear even
though they seem to suggest again a spread of the wage penalty among
the distribution. A different picture is drawn for the lower and higher
levels of skill for which the wage penalty is stronger at the bottom of
the distribution up to the median. Regarding age classes, the changes
in the youngest cohort is almost entirely explained by the wage gap but
this might be not so surprising since the group include people who just
entered the job market and they might not differ a lot in individual at-
tributes. For young workers (from 25 to 35 years old) the wage penalty
is more evident in the middle of the distribution while for the following
cohort (from 35 to 45 years old) the sticky floor effect is present again.
For the last cohort results are not so clear but this may be due to the
fact that the sample size for this group of workers might be small due
to early retirements. Finally the total change in the Gini coefficient is
positive for all the subgroups meaning that inequality in the distribution
is bigger for individuals with temporary contracts. The wage penalty
increases the Gini coefficient for all the sub-groups while, exception for
the two middle skill levels, the attributes tend to lower the difference
between the coefficients of the two groups.
Since Italy is characterized by profound regional differences, we re-
peated the analysis considering the three typical main geographical ar-
eas: the North7, the Center8 and the South together with the islands 9.
It is worth noting that the wage penalty presents some peculiar char-
acteristic for each group. In the northern region the penalty is higher
at the bottom of the distribution and decreases along the rest of it but
it never exceed the 55% of the difference between the two wages. The
central regions follow the same pattern even though the wage penalty
at the bottom of the distribution is higher then the northern regions.
On the other hand in the South of Italy the situation that emerges from
the analysis is quite the opposite. The wage penalty grows from the
bottom to the top of the distribution going from explaining the 55%
of the difference up to the 82% at the ninth quartile. It is possible to
say then that the Southern part of Italy suffers the most regarding the
wage penalty associated with this type of more flexible working agree-
ment. Moreover, while the northern and the central regions of Italy are
7Val d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto,
Trentino-Alto Adige e Friuli Venezia-Giulia.
8Toscana, Umbria, Marche e Lazio
9Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia e Sardegna
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characterised by the ”sticky floor” effect, the South instead suffers of a
”glass ceiling” barrier10. This effect reproduces a wider gap at the top
of the distribution, implying that the disadvantaged group of temporary
workers is paid significantly less than their permanent counterpart in the
high-paid jobs (Bosio, 2013). Anyway in both cases we assist a polari-
sation of the wage distribution. Also the Gini coefficient behaves in the
same way for North and Centre, presenting higher values for the tem-
porary groups and with the attributes that tend to equalize the index
between the two groups. In the southern region though, while the Gini
coefficient is still higher for the temporary group, both the attributes
and the wage penalty concur in increasing the inequality between the
groups meaning that there are differences in characteristics between the
workers of the two groups.
4.4 Decomposing Changes in Wage Distribution
Across Time
We now consider the two years 2007 and 2013. We apply a de-
tailed decomposition illustrated in Eq. 3.21 to disentangle the effect of
changes in the level of temporary contracts, changes in covariate dis-
tribution and changes in the wage structure due to the economic crisis
occurred between those years. Results are plotted in Figure 4.2. The
weighted kernel estimate of the counterfactual densities are plotted in
dash lines against both the two real distribution of wages of 2007 and
2013. Each graph represent a line in the Eq. 3.21: the first on the top
left is the 2013 wage distribution against the weighted kernel estimate
of the counterfactual density which represents the effect of changes in
the distribution of temporary contracts rate. The second one, on the
top right, represents the two estimated counterfactual distributions: the
effect of changes in the distribution of temporary contracts and of the
other job-related covariates. Finally, the third graph, on the bottom
left, is the 2007 wage distribution against the counterfactual for changes
in all the covariates which represents the residual unexplained variance,
our main interest. It is possible to notice from Table 4.8 that the over-
all change between 2013 and 2007 is always negative showing, if not a
decrease, for sure not an increase in the salaries in line with all previ-
10Introduced in the 1980s, the glass ceiling is a metaphor for the invisible
barriers that block minorities (usually it used applied on wage differences for
women) from advancing up the ladder to management positions (Johns, 2013)
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 for Sub-Groups of Population (a)
Males Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,027 -17% 117%
10th Quantile -0,470 47% 53%
25th Quantile -0,400 59% 41%
50th Quantile -0,357 75% 25%
75th Quantile -0,329 68% 32%
90th Quantile -0,387 130% -30%
Females Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,014 -60% 160%
10th Quantile -0,318 37% 63%
25th Quantile -0,300 39% 61%
50th Quantile -0,288 45% 55%
75th Quantile -0,338 57% 43%
90th Quantile -0,318 86% 14%
North Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,018 -13% 113%
10th Quantile -0,344 48% 52%
25th Quantile -0,295 55% 45%
Median -0,290 71% 29%
75th Quantile -0,295 70% 30%
90th Quantile -0,272 82% 18%
Centre Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,013 -35% 135%
10th Quantile -0,262 34% 66%
25th Quantile -0,248 50% 50%
Median -0,280 73% 27%
75th Quantile -0,334 55% 45%
90th Quantile -0,570 89% 11%
South Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,017 62% 38%
10th Quantile -0,357 45% 55%
25th Quantile -0,352 48% 52%
Median -0,377 28% 72%
75th Quantile -0,352 34% 66%
90th Quantile -0,350 18% 82%
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Table 4.6: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 for Sub-Groups of Population (b)
15 - 25 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,001 440% -340%
10th Quantile -0,041 0% 100%
25th Quantile -0,104 0% 100%
50th Quantile -0,172 -12% 112%
75th Quantile -0,178 -8% 108%
90th Quantile -0,182 0% 100%
25-35 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,028 16% 84%
10th Quantile -0,277 59% 41%
25th Quantile -0,236 35% 65%
50th Quantile -0,182 31% 69%
75th Quantile -0,167 53% 47%
90th Quantile -0,153 67% 33%
35-45 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,036 53% 47%
10th Quantile -0,486 50% 50%
25th Quantile -0,403 62% 38%
50th Quantile -0,319 72% 28%
75th Quantile -0,226 62% 38%
90th Quantile -0,227 70% 30%
45-55 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,010 -140% 240%
10th Quantile -0,422 71% 29%
25th Quantile -0,372 44% 56%
50th Quantile -0,325 62% 38%
75th Quantile -0,405 98% 2%
90th Quantile -0,446 77% 23%
55-65 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,033 27% 73%
10th Quantile -0,478 115% -15%
25th Quantile -0,479 85% 15%
50th Quantile -0,420 100% 0%
75th Quantile -0,424 140% -40%
90th Quantile -0,335 261% -161%
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Table 4.7: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 for Sub-Groups of Population (c)
Skill Level 1 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,024 -47% 147%
10th Quantile -0,350 24% 76%
25th Quantile -0,571 20% 80%
50th Quantile -0,223 36% 64%
75th Quantile -0,267 63% 37%
90th Quantile -0,173 123% -23%
Skill Level 2 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,016 34% 66%
10th Quantile -0,316 42% 58%
25th Quantile -0,295 43% 57%
50th Quantile -0,251 47% 53%
75th Quantile -0,250 55% 45%
90th Quantile -0,262 36% 64%
Skill Level 3 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,042 43% 57%
10th Quantile -0,399 74% 26%
25th Quantile -0,370 66% 34%
50th Quantile -0,341 19% 81%
75th Quantile -0,339 84% 16%
90th Quantile -0,112 135% -35%
Skill Level 4 Total Change Attributes Unexplained
Gini 0,029 -157% 257%
10th Quantile -0,479 -14% 114%
25th Quantile -0,405 -8% 108%
50th Quantile -0,342 -12% 112%
75th Quantile -0,348 63% 37%
90th Quantile -0,376 41% 59%
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ous findings. Whilst the share of temporary contracts have almost a
residual factor, the covariates change seems to have a positive effect.
According to DiNardo et al. (1996) this might be due to the increase
in the average number of years of schooling which would be supported
by the descriptive statistics of the sample in Tab 4.4. This expanding
effect is almost completely annulled by the effect of change in the resid-
ual part, or as we call it the wage structure. To us this is a first row
measurement of the impact of change in the labour market structure
due to the economic crisis, with all its complex dynamics. However a
pure economist might say that residual part is only a ”measure of our
non-knowledge” so further discussion is required to give a more specific
interpretation of what ”economic crisis” means and may imply in terms
of wage dynamics. The results show that the way jobs are rewarded
had followed a downward path and this residual factor explains the ma-
jority of the ”stikness” of salaries (Arpaia & Curci, 2010), in line with
what was discussed in Castellano et al. (2017). Martins et al. (2012)
pointed out that recent literature has found that real wages tend to be
pro-cyclical and that the cyclical elasticity of real wages is similar to
that of employment. So it is not unexpected to find a negative wage
growth during the recession. Indeed Schaefer & Singleton (2017) show
that UK firms were able to respond to the Great Recession with sub-
stantial real wage cuts and by recruiting more part-time workers. Elsby
et al. (2016) found the same pattern for UK and USA but they found
difficult to explain their results only on the basis of a downward nominal
wage rigidity hypothesis, and they inquire for more research on the topic.
Arpaia & Curci (2010) suggest that while unemployment put a decreas-
ing pressure on wages, the decline in productivity growth caused by the
recession may have increased unit labour costs. They also suggest that
the decline in wages has been led by the fall in the variable component
which exceeded the relative invariance of negotiated wages. This type
of response may have created competitive pressures at the early stage of
the recovery if negotiated wages did not incorporate the impact of the
recession. They also found heterogeneous impact of the crisis on differ-
ent socio-economic groups and to asses this aspect in our empirical case
we will later proceed in comparing results for subgroups. To conclude
this reflection on what this residual effect means, it is worth introducing
the concept of functional income distribution defined as ”the distribu-
tion of income among the owners of the various factors of production.
Wages accrue to labour, rent to landlords, and interest, dividends, and
retained profits of companies to capital” (John Black & Myles, 2009).
Indeed a new brunch of literature have been focusing recently on the
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fact that functional income distribution underwent drastic changes in
the past decades, along a broader trend of increasing inequality, from
which Stockhammer (2013) and Francese & Mulas-Granados (2015) are
just two examples11. Stockhammer (2013) in particular inquiries the rel-
ative impact of financialisation, globalisation, welfare state shortfall and
technological change on functional income distribution. He suggests that
financialisation has been the main cause of the decline in the wage share
with globalisation, technological change and the decline in welfare state
funding having also had substantial negative effects. Moreover Stock-
hammer (2013) explains that financialisation has two important effects
on bargaining position of labour: it gave mobility to firms in their in-
vestments and it has empowered shareholders relative to workers. This
lead to represent income distribution as the result of a bargaining pro-
cess between firms and labour, typically represented by labour unions.
A lower bargaining power of workers could then lead to a decrease in
wages and, if labour demand is inelastic, to a decrease in the wage share.
Table 4.8: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 - 2007
All Population Total Change Temporary Contract Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,048 -17% -116% 233%
25th Quantile -0,030 -4% -39% 143%
50th Quantile -0,007 -29% -80% 209%
75th Quantile -0,023 -9% -147% 257%
90th Quantile -0,080 0% -43% 143%
Comparing results for men and women separately, it is possible to
see that for men results are less clearer while for women the impact of
the economic crisis on wages distribution has been important all over
the distribution. Again changes in covariates seem to suggest an im-
provement in the attributes but this is not sufficient to overcome the
negative effect of the change in the wage structure. However in both
groups changes in the share of temporary contracts have a residual fac-
tor. This results is in line again with the findings of Elsby et al. (2016)
which found men’s real wages less affected in the Recession while for
11Other examples are Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000), Duménil & Lévy (2001),
Gérard & Dominique (2004) Rossman (2009), Hein & Schoder (2011), Onaran
et al. (2011) and Argitis & Pitelis (2001).
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Figure 4.2: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 - 2007
women the impact was particularly strong. We present now the re-
sults for low and high skill levels. Looking at Tab. 4.10 ( Figures are
in Appendix) it is possible to notice that also in this case the change
in the wage structure has the strongest impact in preventing the 2013
wages to grow. However for lower skills this negative impact seems to be
stronger not only in the lower tail but for the whole distribution. High
skill distribution seems though to be less affected and only up until the
median. This might be a suggestion that the change in the structure
of the labour market is in fact polarising in which especially low skilled
groups are affected. To conclude we would like to stress that the OECD
Employment Outlook 2018 OECD (2018b) recently focused the atten-
tion that, while employment rates have finally recovered and surpassed
the pre-crisis levels, wage growth is still very slow and not equal in the
workforce. Even though macro-economists are still debating over this
topic, in the report they suggest the one of the reasons lies with the
change in the skill demand. As they stated jobs destroyed during the
crisis are not the same as those created in the recovery and high skilled
jobs has been recently the main beneficiaries of the wage growth (and
at the same time less affected by the negative changes in the structure
of the market.) Finally we present the analysis for each macro-region,
namely the North and the South plus Island, as we did in the previous
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 57
paragraph. We now refer to Tab 4.11 (figures are in Appendix) where
it is worth nothing that the effect of the crisis on wages is much more
visible in the southern regions. This indicates that in regions already
considered struggling from an economical point of view, also the shrink-
ing of wages occurred in a greater way. As a control for the results
Table 4.9: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 - 2007 for Males and Females
Males Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,043 0% -132% 232%
25th Quantile 2,992 100% 1% -1%
50th Quantile 0,006 -24% 574% -450%
75th Quantile -0,005 80% -683% 703%
90th Quantile -0,032 11% -162% 252%
Females Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,117 0% 0% 100%
25th Quantile -0,035 -24% -20% 144%
50th Quantile -0,014 -27% -113% 239%
75th Quantile -0,041 -9% -55% 164%
90th Quantile -0,114 0% -34% 134%
presented so far, we repeated the analysis including a year in between,
namely the 2010, to better analyse the temporal impact of changes due
to the Great Recession that may have been included in the residual part.
Fore sake of brevity we present results only for the aggregate part. First
we present the results for the decomposition of wage differentials be-
tween 2007 and 2010, then the decomposition between 2010 and 2013.
While the total change is positive for the period 2007-2010, it becomes
negative in the period 2010-2013. It is possible to see how the dynamics
described before are still valid, what changes is basically the magnitude
of the effect so it possible that the negative effects on wages discussed
before revealed themselves in the second part of the period considered.
4.5 Conclusions
To draw some conclusions it is possible to say that the decrease in
real wages caused by the Great Recession is in line with previous finding
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Table 4.10: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 - 2007 For Skill Level 1 and 4
Skill Level 1 Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,117 -3% 193% -90%
25th Quantile -0,094 -43% 254% -111%
50th Quantile -0,03 -12% 426% -314%
75th Quantile -0,03 -25% 336% -211%
95th Quantile -0,029 -102% 276% -74%
Skill Level 4 Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,048 -78% 505% -327%
25th Quantile -0,079 -36% 266% -129%
50th Quantile -0,216 -2% 116% -15%
75th Quantile -0,314 0% 73% 27%
90th Quantile -0,345 -4% 85% 19%
Table 4.11: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013 - 2007 By Regions
North Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,021 -17% -158% 275%
25th Quantile -0,012 0% 0% 100%
50th Quantile 0,014 0% 174% -74%
75th Quantile -0,010 0% -155% 255%
90th Quantile -0,041 6% -73% 167%
South and Islands Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,074 0% -17% 117%
25th Quantile -0,080 0% -19% 119%
50th Quantile 0,030 0% 0% 100%
75th Quantile -0,043 -27% -32% 159%
90th Quantile -0,175 0% -20% 120%
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Table 4.12: Decomposition of Quantiles on Log of Hourly Wages
2013-2010-2007
2007-2010 Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile 0,032 22% 10% 69%
25th Quantile 0,026 0% 0% 100%
50th Quantile 0,041 7% 3% 90%
75th Quantile 0,027 0% 8% 92%
90th Quantile -0,010 0% 0% 100%
2010-2013 Total Change Temporary Contracts Attributes Unexplained
10th Quantile -0,080 0% -19% 119%
25th Quantile -0,057 1% -24% 123%
50th Quantile -0,048 -1% -6% 106%
75th Quantile -0,050 -10% -42% 152%
90th Quantile -0,070 0% -43% 143%
Figure 4.3: Effect of Wage structure for the periods 2007-2010 and
2010-2013
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even though it is still not clear what are the mechanisms underlying this
relationship. Indeed we showed how much each factor accounts in the
changes of our outcome variable of interest and we gave an indication
about which explanations are to be explored in more detail. However
future work is required to better clarify the reasons underneath such ex-
planations. Second, a sort of segmentation of wages may have occurred
since the Great recession is having different impacts on wages both be-
tween groups and along the distribution. Castellano et al. (2017) suggest
job-polarisation as an explanation while Arestis et al. (2013) suggest
that this stratification effect is at least in part the long-run outcome of
structural processes generated by the financialization process occurred
in our economies. Wages inequalities then seems depends on social in-
stitutions and on the structure of the financial system. These findings
have important implications for economic and social policy. In light of
these reflections it seems foremost important to stress that only a strong
bargaining power of workers can ensure the proper wage adjustments
and proper measures should be taken in consideration to ensure that
the lessen employment protection legislations and the new contractual
forms are not preventing this from happening. Indeed Arpaia & Curci
(2010) expect the growth in the unit labour cost to be more moderate if
new negotiated wages start to incorporate the effect of the recession and
productivity growth recovers. Both Francese & Mulas-Granados (2015)
and Stockhammer (2013) suggests also that strengthening the welfare
state, in particular changing union legislation to foster collective bar-
gaining, and financial regulation could help increase the wage share and
decrease inequality.
Conclusions
The traditional approach to social programme evaluation has been
centred on estimating mean impacts. However the growing interest in
the evaluation literature for models that are informative on the impact
among the entire distribution of an outcome has brought more deep un-
derstanding of how public policies and social interventions affects the
population. Indeed impact evaluation exercises can have strong impact
on reality and for this reason methodological improvements are neces-
sary to better disentangle what affects the outcomes in order to give
policy makers the best tools to make informed and relevant decisions.
Among theses tools the estimation of counterfactual distributions and
decomposition methods have been predominant techniques. More in de-
tail, in this work we have addressed an empirical economic issue that has
been of great relevance for Italy in the last decades, namely the change
occurred in wage distributions of workers and the consequent increase of
wage inequalities. We analysed three possible sources of variation using
data from EU-SILC databases of 2007 and 2013. The first one regards a
change in the labour market institutions that concerns the introduction
and spread of new forms of flexible, more precarious job contracts. Sec-
ondly we took in consideration changes in the personal characteristics
of workers and thirdly we looked into structural changes that occurred
because of the Great Recession. We discussed what structural changes
mean and may imply in term of wage dynamic to provide a meaningful
interpretation of the residual component of the decomposition. From
this complex elaboration of data it is possible to draws some final re-
marks and policy recommendations.
From a methodological point of view we presented two contribu-
tions. First of all we presented a review of the most recent techniques
to evaluate effects among the entire distribution of an outcome vari-
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able of interest. Secondly we have implemented the solid and well know
technique developed by DiNardo et al. (1996) into the context of the
Italian Labour Market that, to my knowledge, has never been done.
This semi-parametric technique recreates different counterfactual distri-
butions through a Kernel estimation over a properly re-weighted sample,
allowing for causal interpretation. This flexible approach was used to
decompose unconditional wage differentials and calculate measures of
inequalities in different but connected scenarios. Differently from for-
mer decomposition works, the residual factor is our main interest since,
under proper independence assumptions, represents the measure of the
impact we are inquiring.
Regarding the the empirical contribution of the work, first we de-
composed the difference in wages for to groups of workers under different
working agreements, respectively temporary and permanent contracts.
In line with previous findings the distribution of wages for temporary
contracts is lower at each quantile and both the personal attributes and
the residual part contribute to lower the distribution. However while
there is a difference in salaries due to differences in personal endow-
ments, temporary contracts suffer of a wage discrimination and this dis-
crimination in concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, especially
for 2013. The decrease in the strength of employment protection legis-
lations occurred only for this type of contracts, eroding the bargaining
power of job-seekers, keeping them into low paid and low skilled jobs
(sticky floor effect), facing a higher risk of systematically lower wages
and more instability. From the sub-group analysis we found that while
for men the sticky floor effect is valid, women present a wage discrim-
ination more spread across the distribution. Low skilled workers and
younger people are the groups who suffer the most from this wage dis-
crimination. From a geographical point of view, while the northern and
central regions present a wage penalty at the bottom of the distribu-
tion, the South of Italy suffers more of a glass ceiling effect in which
temporary workers are paid less then their counterparts especially in
the high-paid jobs. Literature suggests that wage discrimination based
on working agreements might concur in increasing the job polarisation
of the market.
Secondly we decomposed the changes in wage distributions across
time to capture the structural evolution of the labour market due to
the Great Recession of 2008/2009. The results show that the way jobs
are rewarded followed a decreasing path and the residual factor explains
the majority of the ”stickness” (Arpaia & Curci, 2010) of salaries, while
the increase of temporary contracts has a residual effect and other job-
related characteristics have a positive impact. Also this second result
is in line with previous theory that conjectures a less efficient structure
in rewarding skills and creating appropriate job opportunities. Women,
young and low skilled workers seem to be the most affected categories.
This might be a further suggestion that the structure of the labour
market is in fact polarising. Moreover Stockhammer (2013) suggests
that also financialisation has a role in explaining the lack of increase in
wages in the last period since it affect the bargaining position of labour
(along with globalisation, technological change and decline in welfare
state funding). To draw some conclusions we showed how much each
of the factors took in consideration accounts in the changes of our out-
come variable of interest. The decrease in real wages caused by the
Great Recession is in line with previous findings even though what are
the mechanisms underlying this relationship is still a topic of debate. In-
deed we gave an indication about which explanations are to be explored
in more detail. However future work is required to better clarify the
reasons underneath such explanations. A sort of segmentation of wages
may have occurred since the Great recession is having different impacts
on wages both between groups and along the distribution. Castellano
et al. (2017) suggest job-polarisation as an explanation while Arestis
et al. (2013) suggest that this stratification effect is at least in part
the long-run outcome of structural processes generated by the finan-
cialization process occurred in our economies. Wages inequalities then
seems depends on social institutions and on the structure of the financial
system. These findings have important implications for economic and
social policy. In light of these reflections it seems foremost important to
stress that only a strong bargaining power of workers aimed to improve
labour conditions and decrease the precariousness of career paths espe-
cially for the young and low skilled cohorts can ensure the proper wage
adjustments. Measures should be taken in consideration to ensure that
the lessen employment protection legislations and the new contractual
forms are not preventing this from happening. Indeed Arpaia & Curci
(2010) expect the growth in the unit labour cost to be more moderate if
new negotiated wages start to incorporate the effect of the recession and
productivity growth recovers. Both Francese & Mulas-Granados (2015)
and Stockhammer (2013) suggests also that strengthening the welfare
state, in particular changing union legislation to foster collective bar-
gaining, and financial regulation could help increase the wage share and
decrease inequality.
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Appendix A: Wage penalty for
sub-groups of workers
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Figure 4: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Gender
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Figure 5: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Skill Level
1 and 2
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Figure 6: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Skill Level
3 and 4
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Figure 7: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Age Class
15-25 and 25-35
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Figure 8: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Age Class
35-45 and 45-55
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Figure 9: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Age Class
55-65
Figure 10: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Region
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Figure 11: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013 by Region
Appendix B: Decomposing
Changes in Wage Distribution
Across Time for Sub-Groups
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Figure 12: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013-2007 By Gen-
der
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Figure 13: Decomposition of Wage Distribution 2013-2007 by Skills
and Regions
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Appendix C: List of Covariates
Dummy Name Description ISCO 88/08 code
Skill Level 1 Elementary Occupations 9
Skill Level 2
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 8
Craft and related trades workers 7
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 6
Service and sales workers 5
Clerks 4
Skill Level 3 Technicians and associate professionals 3
Skill Level 4 Professionals and Managers 2 and 1
ISCED code
Low Education Level Pre-primary and Primary Education ISCED 0 - 1
Medium Education Level Lower, Upper Secondary Education and
Post Secondary Education
ISCED 2 - 4
High Education Level 1st and 2nd Level of Tertiary Education ISCED 5 - 8
NACE 2 code NACE 1.1 code
Nace 1 Agriculture, hunting and forestry and fishing a a - b
Nace 2 Mining, quarrying, Manifacturing, Electricity b - e c - e
Nace 3 Construction f f
Nace 4 Wholesale and retail trade g g
Nace 5 Hotels and restaurants i h
Nace 6 Transport, storage and communications h - j i
Nace 7 Financial intermediation k j
Nace 8 Real estate, renting and business activities l - n k
Nace 9 Public Administration, Defense o l
Nace 10 Education p m
Nace 11 Health and social Network q n
Nace 12 Other community, social and personal services r-u o -q
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Name Code Description EU-SILC primary variable
Log of Houry Wages # Amount before tax and social insurance
contributions deduction, deflated with FOI
py200G and pl060
Temporary
1 Temporary job/work contract of limited
duration pl140
0 Permanent job/work contract of unlimited
duration
Sex
1 Male
rb0900 Female
Full Time
1 Employed/Self Employed working full time
pl030 for 2007 and pl031 for 20130 Employed/Self Employed working part
time
Immigrant
1 Italian (1st citizenship)
pb220a0 Not Italian (1st citizenship)
Ageclass12
1 15 -| 25
rx020
2 25 -| 35
3 35 -| 45
4 45 -| 55
5 55 -| 65
Managerial position
1 Supervisory
pl1500 Not Supervisory
Experience # the number of years since the respondent
started their first regular job
pl200
Local unit13
1 Persons working at local unit between 1
and 10 pl130
2 Persons working at local unit between 11
and 50
3 Persons working at local unit more than 50
Marital Status14
1 Never Married
pb1902 Married
3 Once Married (Separated, Widowed, Di-
vorced)
Child # Number of children under 18 in HH
Region15 1 North-West
db040
2 South
3 Islands
4 North-East
5 Centre
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